Global Security Surveillance

(draft, forthcoming. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice)

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Summary

Recent literature at the intersections of surveillance, security, and globalization trace the contours of global security surveillance (GSS), a distinct form of social control that combines traditional and technical means to extract or create personal or group data transcending national boundaries to detect and respond to criminal and national threats to the social order. In contrast to much domestic state surveillance (DSS), GSS involves coordination between public and private law enforcement, security providers, and intelligence services across national borders to counteract threats to collectively-valued dimensions of the global order as defined by surveillance agents. While GSS builds upon past forms of state monitoring, sophisticated technologies, the preeminence of neoliberalism, and the uncertainty of post-Cold War politics lend it a distinctive quality. GSS promises better social control against both novel and traditional threats, but it also risks weakening individual civil liberties and increasing social inequalities.

Keywords

surveillance, security, globalization, society, technology, social control

The present era of globalization has been shaped by revolutions in communication, mobility, and commerce. Mobile devices exchanging data across digital networks enable friends and family to communicate across the globe instantaneously and at negligible cost. Airline

companies traversing the world, websites offering reduced fares, and relaxed visa requirements between countries allow travelers to access foreign lands with an ease unknown to previous generations. Digital content and streaming video offered over the internet, coupled with translation services, offer access to information from a variety of countries and languages. Commercial websites give consumers the chance to shop internationally while seated at their computers.

But these processes have also led to less desirable outcomes. The greater ease of border crossings has facilitated the criminal trafficking of persons, drugs, guns, and other contraband. Digital communications and social media have broadened the reach of individuals and groups advocating violence and hatred. Electronic banking and digital commerce have enabled organized crime syndicates to move illicit earnings with relative ease and created new crime opportunities. The existence of large digital archives gives cybercriminals the chance to block access to critical organizational resources in exchange for ransoms. Digitality (Negroponte 1995) in an age of globalization heightens insecurity.

Security and law enforcement agencies and private corporations at the local, national, regional, and international levels have responded to these developments by enhanced efforts to *securitize* society. Information and communication technologies allow for unprecedented monitoring of a diverse range of everyday activities without the traditional restrictions of time and space. Communications via personal computers, mobile devices, and VoIP telephones can be tracked and stored. Information regarding mobility within and beyond countries can be instantaneously obtained by location technologies in automobiles, communication devices, and identity cards. Personal data on education, health, and criminal history can be stolen and sold.

This chapter considers developments at the intersections of surveillance, security, and globalization in order to understand global security surveillance (GSS). GSS is defined as scrutiny through traditional and technical means to extract or create personal or group data transcending national boundaries to detect and respond to threats to the global order. This entry considers four questions. What is global security surveillance? How does it compare to domestic surveillance? What is new about it? And what does it tell us about emerging and future forms of social control?

What is Global Security Surveillance?

News stories on the War on Terror, the NSA, Edward Snowden, and big data have brought digital surveillance carried out in the name of security to public attention. But understanding the global dimensions of security and surveillance requires consideration of basic terms. This section reviews key works on surveillance, security, and globalization and considers their implications for states, boundaries, risk, freedom, justice, privacy, and democracy.

Surveillance

Surveillance studies has emerged as a vibrant research area over the last 20 years in response to the deep changes brought about by advanced information and communication technologies. Scholars in the field wrestle with definitions[i]. But common across the literature is the notion that contemporary surveillance revolves around using technical means for the scrutiny of individuals, groups, and contexts (Marx 2016). The primacy of technological stand-ins rather than simple observation for information gathering and analysis distinguishes what Gary T. Marx's (2016) refers to as the "new surveillance" of today. In contrast, "traditional surveillance" relies on the unaided senses. The evolution of information and communication technologies has

continued to alter the nature of surveillance. Earlier generations of computers and web platforms allowed for the "dataveillance" of individuals and/or masses (Clarke 1988). But not so long after, the participatory architecture of web 2.0 platforms (Fuchs 2011) and the big data capacity of computing systems (Lyon 2015) has blurred the distinctions between "mass" and "targeted" surveillance.

A major current of surveillance studies ties to Foucault's discussion of the "panopticon" (1977) and emphasizes social control. But as David Lyon (2003, 2001) has noted, "surveillance" involves the "care" of health and welfare services as well as the "control" of law enforcement agencies. The "new surveillance" can involve enormously varied contemporary tactics and settings, whether a parent watching a baby on a video monitor at a day care center, an application tracking webpage traffic, license plate recognition cameras detecting traffic violations, or the remote reading of credit cards (Marx 2016).

The new surveillance has consequences for social values such as privacy, identity, and boundaries, although the direction of change is not always obvious. Surveillance can invade privacy (e.g., data harvesting companies that collect and sell personal data without people's knowledge or mobile phone apps that enable users to track the movements of others, such as their intimate partners). Yet surveillance can also be the means of buttressing privacy (e.g., encryption algorithms that safeguard communication, or video cameras and audit trials that record those with access to sensitive data) (Marx 2016, Simmons 2007).

Biometric technologies such as iris scans and genetic fingerprinting assign identity by anchoring it to one's body (Ceyhan 2008, Amoore and de Goede 2005). The digital identities that people construct on Facebook and other social networking platforms serve as easily traceable "data doubles" (Haggerty and Ericson 2006), "dividuals" (Deleuze 1992), or

“electronic doppelgängers” (Norris and Armstrong 1999). And the unrestricted and enduring circulation of digital criminal records online can stigmatize criminal offenders long after they have served their time (Lageson 2017). In these instances, surveillance can threaten the self, as individuals lose some ability to define who they are (Ball and Webster 2003). But digital identities also provide people the opportunity to express themselves in new ways and survey the digital social landscape for new communities of inclusion.

These points underscore the importance of borders. With the piercing abilities of the new surveillance, speaking of the borderless person (or even organization or nation) may become less of an oxymoron as the line between the self and others fades (Marx 2005). Yet managed borders permit “flows” to varying degrees, increasing interpersonal and intergroup exchanges. Individuals are able to use digital tools to do the “boundary work” required to craft “islands of privacy” (Nippert-Eng 2010).

Thus, social contexts are critical in considering the operation and consequences of the new surveillance. Vital here is law. The European Union established itself as a worldwide leader in protecting data privacy when passing the General Data Protection Regulation, which broadened the definition of personal data, required companies to report data breaches in a timely fashion, and provided users the “right to be forgotten”. This strong regulatory action came at a time when countries around the world, European nations included, have facilitated the collection and interception of foreign and/or domestic communications in the name of security with new laws[ii].

Security. Like surveillance, security has a variety of meanings. These include the physical safety of persons and their belongings (Johnston and Shearing 2003), the physical safety of countries from terrorist attacks (Johnston and Shearing 2003, Beck 2001), or the territorial

integrity of countries. During the Cold War, a 'political realist' approach emphasizing the national security of states in confronting military foes and economic competitors held sway (Williams 2012). But since the end of the Cold War, a broader conception of security has emerged that highlights the well-being of human collectivities in political, economic, societal, and environmental terms (Williams 2012). With this approach, security is broadened to include the conservation of natural environments (Beck 1992), the productive functioning of the global economy (Beck 2001), and the protection of group identities and cultures (Ericson 1994). The protection of first nation peoples under European colonization is illustrative of this more expansive definition.

Security in this broader sense refers to the preservation of society's symbolic order (Bigo 2008a). It concerns "the alleviation of threats to cherished values…especially those which, left unchecked, threaten the survival of a particular referent object in the near future" (Williams 2012: 6). This definition implies a conflict or struggle between parties. "The episteme of security is about the uncertainty and ambiguity of human action. What is called security is the result of legitimacy struggles between actors, who tend to mask this element of uncertainty and to claim their monopoly over the certainty of the boundaries of security (for them and for the others), to affirm their capacity to know the future and to have preventive actions, and to eliminate the ambiguity of the practices included in this process" (Bigo 2012: 126).

Security has been a constant topic of interest for scholars studying surveillance. Significantly, security entails a different logic from the "discipline" component of surveillance emphasized by Foucault. Discipline carries a missionary logic of transforming and ordering an external world thought to be defined by chaos, disorder, and danger. Security, in contrast, possesses a custodial logic of preserving that order (Guzik 2016). Security emphasizes the

prevention of crime before it occurs, or front end control (Bogard 2006). Dataveillance technologies are used to "social sort" (Lyon 2003) individuals in a countless number of social settings: bona fide global citizens and "crimmigrant" others at borders (Aas 2011, Braverman 2010), desirable and undesirable automobility and pedestrian mobility at urban intersections (Monahan 2007), and good and bad risks for criminal rehabilitation at courts and prisons (Feeley and Simon 1992). Security serves then as a key driver of surveillance, not only at the 'national' level, but also for policing, workplaces, transit systems, and schools (Taylor 2013).

Surveillance supports the broader security goal of *prevention and protection* of the social order. For instance, surveillance can serve goals such as: *compliance* to determine whether subjects are in conformity with rules; *verification* of personal identity in a world where individuals are not personally known; *discovery* of potential security threats when agents have an inkling that something of interest is afoot without knowing the details; and the generation of *documentation* to memorialize or create a reviewable record of subjects and their activities (Marx 2016).

Pursuing these goals involves both hard engineering (developments in computerization, electronics, biochemistry, materials science, and architecture) and soft engineering (efforts at persuasion, seduction, manipulation, and deception, such as undercover efforts to entice those with violent predilections into the open) (Marx 2008). The private sector plays a central role here by creating the hardware or software for security work and/or conducting the monitoring themselves, whether by subcontracting with state security agencies or complying with legal requirements to share user data. The nexus of public and private partnerships in security surveillance makes it possible to talk of the "private security state" (Ball et al. 2015) or "surveillance industrial complex" (Ball and Snider 2013, Hayes 2012), fed by unprecedented

access to private and public sector data on individuals, extraordinary funding for public–private partnerships to develop surveillance applications, corporate lobbying of politicians in procurement processes, and extensions and intensifications of border control amid a cultural climate of vigilance and fear (Altheide 2017).

The embedding of security surveillance into daily life through the private sector can also decrease awareness of it presence. When all air passengers are checked at airport security gates, surveillance appears less conspicuous and more normalized. With the collection of meta-data on bulk communication records, surveillance is hardly visible. Defenders of government surveillance find it easier to minimize or deny concerns about their bulk spying activities, because the government is not watching 'you' specifically (Lyon 2015).

Globalization

These developments in surveillance and security have occurred in a world that has become increasingly globalized in recent decades. Globalization refers to a set of processes involving remote systemic structure, fluid or liquid social relationships and identites (Baumann 2001), and multidirectional flows (Appadurai 1996) of people, objects, places and information (Ritzer and Dean 2015: 2). These flows are not new. But they have accelerated with the end of the Cold War, which separated the world into distinct economic, political, and cultural zones, and the intensification of technological innovation in information processing, digital communication, and air and ground transportation (Giddens 1993, Castells 1996).

Globalization has had profound consequences for domestic and international social order and organization. Information technologies have brought about a new a form of contemporary power—empire—detached from the sovereign nation-state model (Hardt and Negri 2000). But not all countries are impacted by globalization equally. Inequality has increased both within and

between countries (Milanovic 2016), refuting the Kuznets hypothesis that the initial increase in inequality following from industrialization will diminish over time. This inequality, in turn, has led to new flows of people across borders. Migration has emerged as a primary social and political concern with increased conflicts within receiving countries (Fakhoury 2016).

These processes are intimately tied to security surveillance. Security governance often attends to flows of people and manufactured goods between the Global South and Global North (Aas 2011, Sparks 2008). The ease of global exchanges of goods and ideas has benefited drug cartels and transnational organized crime networks (whether trafficking in arms, drugs or humans) (Andreas 2002). The state's lessened economic role in the neoliberal order has left gaps in the economy and national security apparatus in which organized crime networks grow and prosper (Velasco 2005, Moser 2004). Not only have national governments proven unable to deal with the new insecurities, but organized crime networks often comprise elements of the political order (Arias and Goldstein 2010, Serrano and Celia Toro 2002)[iii].

The technologies that make economic and cultural globalization possible are themselves vulnerable to new types of crimes. Hackware and malware can instantaneously disable information systems worldwide (Woollaston 2017). The internet and the artifacts of everyday life (mobile devices, planes) can be weaponized against users (Levine 2018).

The global is also connected to increased perceptions of insecurity. Globalization and the emergence of global culture has strengthened local primary identities. These are often formed from idealized reconstructions of the past that are believed to be threatened by contact with other cultures (Castells 1996). Religious intolerance directed at other faiths becomes more acceptable when cherished values and identities are seen to be threatened (Cronin 2002/3).

Global Security Surveillance

Tying these different literatures together, what global security surveillance concerns is authorities' use of new and traditional surveillance to respond to perceived insecurities in the global system. More specifically, GSS can be defined as *scrutiny through traditional and technical means to extract or create personal or group data transcending national boundaries to detect and respond to criminal threats to the global social order*. A prominent example of global security surveillance is the NSA surveillance activities revealed by Edward Snowden. Here, a federal government intelligence agency teamed with international counterparts as well as private companies to deploy sophisticated surveillance hardware and software to intercept global telecommunications in an effort to detect terrorist plots against the United States and its allies. But GSS goes far beyond NSA mass surveillance. Consider:

> For the 2018 World Cup, the host nation of Russia released a unique identity card—the FAN ID—for attendees. Consisting of laminated plastic card and measuring 146mm by 94 mm, the FAN ID contained visitors' photo, name, sex, date of birth, citizenship, passport number, and registration number. This information appeared on the card itself as well as on a bar code and RFID chip embedded in the card. The card served multiple purposes. It was required to gain entry to games, but it also served as a visa for entry into the country and as a ticket for free public transport to and from games. The FAN ID was designed to discourage illicit ticket sales and promised increase control over hooligans and others looking to disrupt the event (TASS 2018).

> In October 2013, US authorities arrested Ross Ulbricht on conspiracy, drug, and money laundering charges. Ulbricht was the mastermind behind Silk Road, the dark web black market where users could traffic drugs, stolen credit cards, and counterfeit currencies. The network had relied on Tor anonymizing software and Bitcoin cryptocurrency to elude the notice of authorities for years. A collection of US federal agencies headed the investigation, but the break in the case came when

Australian officials arrested Paul Leslie Howard, a recent trader on the site, after Customs and Border agents intercepted drug shipments sent to him from the Netherlands and Germany. With Howard's arrest, investigators gained access to private messages and the personal information of other Silk Road users, including their Bitcoin accounts, which allowed them to monitor the digital activities of Ulbricht (Zetter 2013).

In December 2014, a team of FBI investigators and police officers in Moldova conducted a sting operation that resulted in the arrest of six people connected to the sale of 200 grams of unenriched uranium for $15,000. The sale was part of a much larger 2.5 million Euro transaction agreed to by the seller, Valentin Grossu. It was one of four other sting operations in the previous five years targeting black market sales of radioactive materials smuggled through the former Soviet republic. The Moldovan police officer heading the sting needed 20 meetings with Grossu to convince him that he was a representative of the Islamic State and that the material would be used to target the West. The sting operation relied on old-fashioned undercover tactics and high-tech gear, such as a special shirt with microphones woven into its fabric to avoid detection. The collaboration between US and Moldova underscored the breakdown in communications between Russia and the West on nuclear smuggling (Butler and Ghirda 2015). To help fill that gap, in 2017, the US installed 18 radiation portal monitors and related communications systems in the Chisinau International Airport to detect radioactive material (NNSA 2017).

These examples illustrate the elements that mark GSS as a distinct form of social control. Each involves criminal risk that is not only global in its scope, but also enabled by and targeted against the global system. The World Cup is the premier sporting event in the world hosting teams and fans from a number of different countries, which makes it a prime target of groups opposed to the cultural or political aspects of globalization—any violence at the event (whether

terrorism or hooliganism) would cause disruptions beyond the host nation. Silk Road allowed illegal trafficking that violated laws in numerous countries, but more importantly the online black market was embedded into the technological and logistical infrastructure enabling international trade, which delegitimized the rule of law in the global system. The sale of nuclear materials that could be weaponized by a radical statist movement (or others) threatens the security of people across countries—such an attack would also disrupt the prevailing political order in the world.

State security officials cooperated across borders and leaned on private entities in order to respond to these threats. Police and state security agencies shared data on hooligans with Russian authorities and sought to restrict their travel in order to prevent fan violence at the World Cup. The first major step in US officials' investigation against Silk Road came from Border and Customs officers in Australia intercepting drugs sent from Europe. The investigation also benefitted from the cooperation of Mt. Gox, a Bitcoin exchange based in Japan through which Silk Road traders transferred funds, and the VPN (virtual private network) provider used by Ulbricht. Police officers in Moldova similarly played a key role in identifying uranium smugglers there, and the Chișinău International Airport now stands as a key partner in monitoring the movement of nuclear materials.

Authorities' efforts to respond to these criminal threats were also supported by innovative communication and information technologies that allowed them to monitor people and things in novel ways. The FAN ID was a sophisticated identity card equipped with magnetic strips and RFID chips that allowed data to be quickly processed by associated scanning technology. The FBI's investigation of Silk Road was aided by pen registers used to track telecommunication and geolocation data on communication devices. And the sting operation against nuclear smugglers

in Moldova involved sophisticated listening devices stitched into clothing, while the monitoring of nuclear materials going forward relies on detection equipment installed at the international airport.

Global security surveillance is distinct from other related forms. Various types of global surveillance can be identified (Murakami Wood 2012). Organizations like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank monitor the performance of national governments (Gill 2003). But surveillance aimed at assessing economic and political factors differs from GSS, which monitors individuals and groups believed to be threats to the social order. There are also various national and regional political entities ('problem states' such as North Korea, regions that seek independence from their national states) and bio-environmental processes (viruses, diseases, global warming, catastrophes) that are perceived to threaten the international order. But GSS, unlike international relations and environmental management, specifically concerns the actions of non-state actors, even if lines can be blurred as these actors may have support from state sponsors. The following sections explore the contours of global security surveillance by distinguishing it from domestic and historic counterparts.

Is Global Security Surveillance Different from Domestic Security Surveillance?

Security surveillance is a novel form of power that transcends traditional categorizations. Simple distinctions between war, defense, security, police investigations, and public, internal, and international order are challenged by the current state of affairs (Bigo 2008b). The classic division between high policing (dedicated to criminal activities targeting the state) and low policing (dedicated to crimes against citizens) breaks down with security surveillance (Brodeur and Leman-Langlois 2006). "Homeland security" represents a new stage of policing (Oliver

2006). Major municipal police departments now use big data integrating information across separate institutional databases to predict crime. This brings a large number of innocent people into the police's gaze (Brayne 2017).

Borders are no longer static geographic places (Marx 2005). Rather, they move (Adey 2012), as technologies enabling smart borders, passenger screening, and financial data tracking are not limited by geography (Gates 2012). These same technologies make it difficult to know who is conducting surveillance (Lyon 2015)—surveillance agents have become so dependent on socio-technical relationships that the 'actant' behind the monitoring act is often best described as a human and database hybrid (Bigo 2012).

From this perspective, the traditional distinctions between local police and national security agencies make little sense. Instead, "archipelagos of policing" exist today structured along lines of cultural identification, mission, organizational level, and technologies (see Bigo 2008a). Indeed, the technological tools through which policing and security are now accomplished and the sense of insecurity experienced at the community and global levels erase traditional boundaries between domestic and global social control.

Table 1 contrasts domestic and global security surveillance, drawing on dimensions of surveillance structure from Marx (2016). The overlap between the two is significant. Security serves as a primary *goal* of surveillance at both the local and global levels, and security surveillance work is done through partnerships linking the resources of different *agents*, including police forces, public institutions, and private companies. Using the *means* of both traditional surveillance (undercover policing, patrols) and new surveillance (geo tracking, big data, predictive analytics), security surveillance at both the domestic and global scale seeks as a *strategy* to react to crime that has already occurred as well as predict and preempt crime that has

yet to manifest. This raises the question of whether current global developments are simply a scaling up of the ‘old’ new surveillance, or whether they alter its shape and nature (see Murakami Wood 2012).

Clear differences separate DSS and GSS. Even when the *goals* of surveillance involve security, the nature of this interest can differ at the domestic and global levels. By definition, global security involves objects or matters of more universal concern while domestic security involves more local concerns. Thus, while nuclear proliferation or terrorism tend to be viewed as common threats across national borders, arms and drug trafficking may not be, especially in contexts where gun ownership is embedded into local culture and national law (Bellesiles 2000) and illicit drug trafficking benefits local communities and the state (Hernández 2014). Thus, DSS can sometimes reflect the insecurities of local and national authorities rather than those of the global community, such as when spyware purchased from an international vendor was used to spy on human rights investigators and activists in Mexico (Ahmed 2017).

TABLE 1: DOMESTIC VERSUS GLOBAL SECURITY SURVEILLANCE

	DOMESTIC SECURITY SURVEILLANCE	**GLOBAL SECURITY SURVEILLANCE**
GOALS	security of local order	security of global order
AGENTS	local and national police agencies; public institutions; private companies;	national police and intelligence agencies; public

		institutions; private companies
SUBJECTS	domestic	foreign
STRATEGY	both reactive and predictive	both reactive and predictive
MEANS	traditional and new surveillance	traditional and new surveillance
LEGAL OVERSIGHT	restrictive	permissive
CULTURAL ALIGNMENT	congruous	incongruous

Similarly, the *subjects* of security surveillance tend to vary by levels, with DSS focused internally on residents of a particular jurisdiction and GSS focused externally across jurisdictional boundaries. This distinction is set in part by the *legal contexts* in which DSS and GSS operate. Laws regulating state surveillance are more restrictive when monitoring domestic places and people (Bigo et al. 2013). Reflective of this, domestic security surveillance has greater public accountability than global security surveillance. Police at the local and federal levels are answerable to the judiciary, whose responsibility it is to balance the need for crime control versus due process (Packer 1968). Police monitoring of public space is part of law enforcement work. More invasive police monitoring of criminal suspects requires judicial authorization with details on the purpose and nature of monitoring. Agents at the global level, who often include intelligence services, work in greater secrecy. Within the US, authorizations for monitoring are decided in specialized foreign intelligence courts or under the oversight of military agencies and Congressional committees (Swire 2004), which reduces their accountability to the public.

These differences between DSS and GSS can result in distinct *cultural alignments* between surveillance agents and surveillance subjects. Local populations might disagree with the definitions of harm operating at the global level or not share the cultural background with security services. And this can heighten the possibilities of resistance to monitoring (De Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito 2005).

These distinctions notwithstanding, DSS and GSS are often tied in practice. The ability of authorities to detect the trafficking of nuclear materials through Moldova or of illicit drugs through Silk Road was tied to the surveillance work of Moldovan and Australian police officers on the ground. When meshing, DSS and GSS can reinforce one another. The more permissive legal framework governing global security surveillance offers national authorities a backdoor for domestic monitoring otherwise prohibited by law (Deibert 2013). The cultural alignment between surveillance agents and subjects in DSS can contribute to identifying criminal risk to the global order (Newburn and Sparks 2004).

Is Global Security Surveillance New?

Beyond considering the spatial scale of security surveillance, attention to its temporal dimensions needs consideration. If neither surveillance, security, nor globalization are entirely new phenomena, is global security surveillance itself new?

GSS in many respects dates back centuries. Prior eras of globalization involved surveillance. During European colonization of Africa, the Americas, and portions of Asia during the 16th to 18th centuries, surveillance was central to political power. The colonial period was defined by mercantilist economic arrangements, and European powers' ability to monitor people and things beyond its border was integral to its protective economic and political activities.

Fingerprinting as a security practice started in India to identify pensioners and prisoners and population surveys, and maps made foreign populations and lands legible to colonial authorities (Sa'adi 2012, Scott 1998).

The Spanish colonization of the Americas is illustrative of this history. The Spanish crown encountered problems securing its shipments of colonial gold and silver bullion from British pirates. The latter's bounty helped finance the British state. In Mexico, the Camino Real de Tierra Adentro (the Royal Road of the Interior Lands) was the commercial lifeline of the colony, with silver extracted from the colony's mines transported to awaiting Spanish galleons in Veracruz. This economic activity eventually attracted bandits, and a new policing body—the Guarda Mayor de Caminos (Elite Guard of Roadways)—was founded to root them out. The Guarda established guardhouses along major transit points in the colony and would escort travelers as they passed (MacLachlan 1974), helping ensure the global shipment of goods.

Similarly, the US global empire emerging in the late 19th Century brought forth new types of surveillance. From the 1870s to the 1880s, innovations in textual, statistical, and visual data collection and analysis defined the US's first information revolution and fueled surveillance practices (McCoy 2015). Following its military occupation of the Philippines, the US faced stiff resistance to its rule. During a three-year pacification campaign in Manila, from 1898 to 1901, the U.S. Army created a domestic police force that applied military intelligence and data management as a form of counterintelligence. When U.S. civil rule started in 1901, "Manila's colonial police added the most advanced of America's crime control technologies—a centralized phone network, the Gamewell system of police-fire alarms, incandescent electrical lighting for city streets, Bertillon's photo identification, and fingerprinting" (McCoy 2015:8). Surveillance was central to the colonization effort. And within the next two decades, the Manila police

amassed 200,000 alphabetized file cards on the city's population, some 70 per cent of the total population. The themes of advanced technology, cooperation between different types of authorities, broad surveillance, and foreign intelligence— all dimensions of global security surveillance—are seen in this historical example.

The formation of the modern state in Europe also involved the use of secret police whose monitoring activities extended beyond national borders. The search for the Napoleanic Empire's enemies brought forth an encompassing state policing system with continuous internal and external surveillance. Justus Gruner similarly founded a high police force for the Prussian empire in the early 19th Century. Spies were sent abroad to monitor the activities of opponents of the state (Fijnaut and Marx 1995). The Okhrana in the service of the Russian czar in the late 19th Century sought to identify revolutionaries at home and abroad.

The late colonial, early modern international order saw new police tactics focusing on the flows of immigrant labor and raw and produced goods that fueled national economic development. As colonial regimes slowly dissolved, sending troublemakers to far-flung lands as a tactic of social control became difficult, and new ways to manage populations appeared (Ball and Snider 2013). The passport, which made citizens more 'legible' (Scott 1998) within the embrace of the state, is a prime example. The passport offered the state a monopoly on the means of movement (Torpey 2000), while it also helped determine and create national character and identity (e.g., what it meant to be French or British as distinct from other groupings (Lyon 2010: 53)).

The global security surveillance regime now operated by the NSA has a clear foundation in the Second World War and the construction of the post-War world. Exchange of intelligence was an important part of US-UK efforts during the war, and this co-operation continued

thereafter, which came to include other British dominions and former colonies (e.g., Australia, New Zealand, and Canada) in the form of the "Five Eyes" coalition (Farrell 2017). During the Cold War, these surveillance systems operated to contain Communism in Asia, with Australia and New Zealand serving as key beachheads for US surveillance. New security techniques developed by the United States during the Cold War were strengthened by developments in surveillance technology and computer systems (Mattelart 2008). The use of drones to target persons in Africa and the Middle-East from control rooms in Florida and Nevada grew out of these developments (Murakami Wood 2017).

Beyond the US-UK alliance, policing has long been tied to international relations. The post-war period saw the birth of international policing infrastructures (NATO, INTERPOL) to fight drug trafficking and terrorism in 1960s and 1970s (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006). The "Club of Berne", made up of the countries of the EU, and various other configurations and security agreements bind countries internationally in security work (Privacy International 2017). Rather than the "everything changed after 9/11" view, GSS represents an acceleration of earlier trends: further collapsing external/internal security, repackaging old missions as part of counterterrorism, intensified securitization of border trade, travel and financial flows, and further expansion of intel agencies into law enforcement (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006). In this sense, little has changed relative to the broad goals of national security (Lemieux 2008). The turn to electronic surveillance, biometric identification, and unmanned aerial vehicles in the pacification of Afghanistan and Iraq can be considered a third U.S. information regime following the pre-war and post-war models (McCoy 2015).

TABLE 2: GLOBAL SECURITY SURVEILLANCE ACROSS HISTORY		
	PRIOR ERAS	**CONTEMPORARY ERA**
GOALS	imperial & national power	global security
AGENTS	colonial authorities; military authorities	national police and intelligence agencies; public institutions; private companies
SUBJECTS	foreign	foreign
STRATEGY	predictive	predictive
MEANS	traditional surveillance	traditional and new surveillance
LEGAL OVERSIGHT	permissive	permissive
CULTURAL ALIGNMENT	incongruous	incongruous

Yet, claims about historical equivalence must be qualified. In broad outline, Table 2 distinguishes contemporary GSS from earlier forms. As the table demonstrates, there is continuity. For example, in the areas of *strategy* and *subjects*, global surveillance would appear to be consistently predictive and focused on foreign populations. Just as government authorities in the US-controlled Philippines or Vietnam sought to discover threats to their rule by gathering information on the general population, so too do authorities in the early 21st century seek to discover threats to the social order through surveillance. The nature of this surveillance work presents considerable incongruity in the *cultural alignment* between those being monitored and

those monitoring. The resurgence of local identity today in regions of the world where external powers seek to impose their influence speaks to differences in cultural values and political power in much the same way that the emergence of anti-colonial movements did in past eras. In addition, there are few *legal constraints* to global surveillance across historical periods. GSS primarily remains a function of military and other agencies within the executive branch.

Nevertheless, clear points of contrast can be drawn. The *goals* of global surveillance have changed over time. GSS today endeavors to secure the operation of the global economy, predicated on the free trade of goods across national borders, and its symbolic order (Murakami Wood 2012). Black market trade in illicit goods through sites like Silk Road and terrorist violence targeting cherished international events like the World Cup threaten the legitimacy of the global system. This contrasts with the global security surveillance of previous times, which was largely undertaken in pursuit of protecting the power and economic interests of different imperial powers (Spain, France, England, the US).

The *agents* of surveillance vary as well. In prior eras, those carrying out the surveillance were colonial authorities or military officials exercising their power in the name of a foreign crown or seat of government. The visible, dramatic use of sovereign power could be counter-productive because it invited resistance from mistreated citizens or those concerned about state abuses of power (Ball and Snider 2013). In the contemporary, post-colonial world, the governmental authorities conducting surveillance come from sovereign governments, often collaborating across borders and ostensibly acting in the interests of their nation-state. The national police officers whose work was critical to dismantling Silk Road and the smuggling of radioactive materials in Moldova were also serving national interests and sovereignty in helping disrupt global threats. In the case of Moldova, these efforts follow decades of political weakness

as a post-Soviet state. And again, the agents of surveillance today are often from the private sector. While private companies always had a role to play in security work beyond (and within) national borders, the private sector today is involved in surveillance work to a degree that would have simply been unimaginable during earlier eras. The US outsourced aspects of its War on Terror to corporations (and other countries). In areas such as money laundering and tracking terrorist financing, much policing has been privatized and subcontracted (Ball et al. 2015). This monitoring is more difficult to identify (and resist) given its integration into daily life (Wesseling, de Goede, and Amoore 2012).

The *technologies* used to pursue surveillance have clearly changed over time as well. Surveillance since the later 19th century could involve tapping telephonic communications and monitoring movements from the air. But it was labor intensive, and data collected in different forms, places, and times were rarely merged. Surveillance was still largely inductive, needing to identify a suspect and build an inquiry around that person. These techniques have not disappeared (e.g., the continued use of sting operations and time-intensive police investigations). But the scale, comprehensiveness, speed, and power of this was modest relative to today's new surveillance. The instantaneous search of vast databases upon the presentation of an identity card can identify football hooligans using multiple, integrated data pools. Social networking sites help track drug traffickers on the dark web. Radioactive detectors at airports locate nuclear materials. These new technologies transform the nature of policing.

What does Global Security Surveillance Mean for the Future of Social Control?

The previous sections highlighted the spatial and temporal dimensions of global security surveillance. This entry concludes by considering some of the challenges both presented and

faced by GSS. Discussions of the impact of surveillance in contemporary society often take the form of a balance sheet where the costs and benefits are presumed to be clear. When a terrible incident occurs, political leaders and the public stress the need for increased surveillance to preserve security, whether or not acknowledging to individual liberties. But what other unwanted (or too costly) consequences may flow from increased surveillance? And how certain can we be that surveillance will in fact produce greater security in society, whether in the short or longer run?

Different levels of analysis need to be considered. The threat of increased surveillance to privacy is clear. Continuous monitoring reduces the ability to be 'let alone' in daily life (note the intrusiveness of security operations on the ease of navigating through airports, roads, and even university libraries). Personal privacy is an individual-level factor directly experienced. Beyond individual privacy however, GSS presents challenges at other levels of analysis.

Some groups are more likely to be under surveillance than others. Across Europe and the US, young, Muslim men from Middle Eastern countries or of Arab ancestry have become the public face of terrorism. The unequal application of surveillance has consequences for the rights of movement and communication of entire groups (Guzik 2009). Conversely, in Latin America, security surveillance, when viewed as a privilege, often excludes a large part of the urban population (Arteaga Botello 2012). With respect to costs, Ball et al. (2015) find, smaller firms in the travel and finance sectors, which are heavily implicated in global security surveillance, have more difficulty complying with governmental security requirements than larger firms, thus heightening inequality in these sectors.

At the national level, GSS differentially impacts the sovereignty of countries and the accountability that is the basis of democratic rule. The US's Global War on Terror, in its efforts

to identify terrorist threats, enrolled the national security services of countries with recent histories of authoritarian rule—for instance, CIA black sites in Poland and Hungary—in an attempt to keep its activities outside of public oversight. In addition, the technical opacity (the difficulty for citizens to understand the technology behind bulk data collection) and algorithmic opacity (the difficulty for citizens to access the algorithms guiding the collection and processing of bulk data) of security surveillance threatens the transparency of government and private sector operations required by democratic rule (Robbins and Henschke 2017).

It also needs be asked to what extent GSS can actually increase security in society. Technological surveillance systems can encounter a wide variety of difficulties. The technology may not work as claimed. For example, poorly imprinted fingerprints or cars varying by VIN format limit their registration in electronic databases (Guzik 2016). Systems may be incompatible, and it may be impossible to anticipate the complexities, contingencies, and confounding factors found with real world applications (Marx 2008). Sometimes, the wrong hard and software tools might be chosen.

The gaps between stated intentions and the fullness of outcomes may also reflect self-serving entrepreneurial spin, outright prevarication, selective and misperception, wish-fulfillment, paranoia, tunnel vision, and a lack of motivation on the part of those who apply the tools (Marx and Guzik 2017). Attempts to make sense of data collected through technology are inherently complex (Kroener and Neyland 2012). Fusion centers intended to integrate and analyze diverse streams of data to identify threats may be staffed by external contractors without the conviction or training of sworn officers (Monahan 2009). GSS can also require "re-mediation", where private sector employees transform their customers' identification data to security databases. But this work does not always fit cleanly into existing organizational settings,

nor is it often compensated (Ball et al. 2015), thus potentially decreasing its efficacy. The private sector's role in security can compete with its hunt for profits, a situation not found in the public sector.

There can also be resistance. Elsewhere, Marx (2016) identifies 11 behavioral techniques intended to subvert the collection of information, many of which are relevant for thinking about resistance to global security surveillance[iv]. These strategies are supported by a profusion of new technologies to protect against surveillance (Marx 2008).

However, resistance goes beyond the individual level, as social attitudes can impact the operation of surveillance. Cultural mindsets toward privacy, individual rights, community, and government are relevant as both conditioners and reflectors of history and social structure. Memories of 20th century totalitarianism have served as a source of resistance to surveillance efforts such as the installation of CCTV cameras in multiple European countries (see Wagenaar, van Brakel, and Boersma 2014, Norris, McCahill, and Wood 2004).

But cultural beliefs are not fixed. Surveillance on citizens for the purposes of public welfare (social security numbers as a requirement for government benefits) has been overt—thus, people found it easier to accept (Weller 2012:61). With regards to security, terrorist attacks have been shown to increase support for surveillance (Norris 2017).

Cultural values also effect responses to private sector efforts that are at the heart of GSS. Surveillance technology companies are prone to take a "country-agnostic framework" in deciding where and what to sell. Yet advocates and governments can influence these decisions through political actions, such as campaigns to extend no-sell zones beyond sanctioned governments to 'authoritarian' ones (such as selling deep packet inspection to the Erdogan regime in Turkey) (Lauterback 2017). In this regard, global security surveillance intensifies

debates around universal rights, national interests, social responsibility, and democratic governance that have been ongoing for centuries (Weller 2012:63).

Global security surveillance is also challenged by the nature of globalization itself. First, as noted earlier, globalization ironically creates its own insecurities. The opening of borders and the free flow of goods increases the opportunities for organized crime and illicit trafficking to grow. The free exchange of information and culture and the increasing inequality emblematic of globalization can create cultural reactions that invigorate nativist sentiments and encourage violence in the name of local values and traditions believed to be threatened by outsiders. The ease of financial transactions on a global scale facilitates white collar crime, and those financially benefiting from globalization have means to hide their assets from their national tax agents. It must be asked then how well global security surveillance can work when the threats it targets are the products of globalization itself.

Furthermore, globalization today differs from the initial claims and hopes for it. GSS requires a normalization of homeland security as a form of governmental rationality (Gates 2012) in which technology is imagined as an appropriate response to agreed-upon threats (Bigo 2008b). But perceptions of threat are in flux. There is a fluidity to social problems and their definition that no control effort can stem indefinitely. States that once enthusiastically supported globalization are turning away or seeking to modify it in ways that weaken its foundation. While Fukuyama (1992) once declared the end of the end of history with the fall of the Soviet Union and alternatives to liberal, market economies, events of the recent past indicate the end of the end of history. It is noteworthy that the two countries that were perhaps the biggest supporters of the international, global order—the United Kingdom and the United States—are questioning it today. These trends among liberal, democratic nations are also seen in a more general

authoritarian turn across the world (see, for example, the Philippines, Venezuela, Syria). In such cases the rules and guarantees of a global legal order are taken as constraints upon an orderly society, rather than foundations for the rule of law.

Yet authoritarian trends are not an indication of a move against global security surveillance *in toto*. Indeed, some of the biggest defenders of the global order recently have been authoritarian governments (China, Russia) that value the global economic system and often partner with geopolitical adversaries (the US) to face common global security threats. But authoritarianism could certainly reshape global security surveillance, as these countries look to nationalize and restrict the internet through measures like the Great Firewall of China, which places more control over digital information in the hands of national governments.

An authoritarian turn could lead to several global surveillance futures. We could see a continuation of nationalist, authoritarian regimes; a reassertion of neoliberal globalism; a technologically-determined future set by the dominant companies dealing in information economy (Google, Alibaba, Facebook, Amazon); and/or an inclusive future based on opposition to all three (see Murakami Wood 2017). Many observers were caught off guard by the rapid rise of globalization, just as many have been caught off guard by its current troubles. So too, the future of global security is uncertain. But whatever shape that future takes, surveillance in the name of preempting threats will remain and change, presenting new opportunities and challenges.

Review of the Literature

Global Security Surveillance is not a new phenomenon. But it has only recently become a topic of academic inquiry. Readers interested in this topic are fortunate to have a number of

recent works available to them. David Murakami Wood's forthcoming *The Watched World* (2018) engages with different forms of surveillance utilized to manage the economic, environmental, and communication systems underlying the global order. Armand Mattelart's (2008) *The Globalization of Surveillance* builds from Foucault's work on biopower to examine how today's "society of security" has evolved out of the security techniques deployed by the United States during the Cold War and the growth of information and communication technologies. A welcome perspective on security surveillance outside the Global North (where most of the literature is focused) is offered by Nelson Arteaga Botello (2009) in *Sociedad de la vigilancia en el Sur-Global: Mirando America Latina/ Surveillance Society in the Global South: Looking at Latin America*—Arteaga notes how security surveillance represents a key good in Latin America from which a large part of the population is excluded, but also a means through which elites can manage traditional economic, social, and political divisions in society. These works come from scholars with at least one foot in the field of surveillance studies, but valuable contributions for understanding global security surveillance can be found in other fields as well. For example, *Policing the Globe* from Andreas and Nadelmann (2006), from political science perspective, traces different historical eras of international policing leading up to the present.

Global security surveillance sits at the intersection of surveillance, security, and globalization studies. Each of these areas has its own literature that interested readers should pursue. Research on surveillance provides conceptual frameworks for understanding the topic as a social phenomenon. The efforts of Gary T. Marx and David Lyon provide starting points for students new to the field. Marx's (2016) *Windows into the Soul* builds on the theoretical traditions of Goffman and Merton to provide an authoritative guide for understanding the structure and contextual variation of surveillance in contemporary society. Lyon's (2001)

Surveillance Society draws on sociological theory to highlight the control and care functions of surveillance, with their associated consequences for risk and privacy, in a digital age where physical presence is diminished. Other surveillance scholars, drawing from post-structuralist theory, have tended to take a more critical stance towards surveillance. At a still early point of the information era, Ericson and Haggerty's (1996) *Policing the Risk Society* examines how police can become data brokers in service of key institutions (insurance, health, welfare) with an interest in managing people and their risk. In *Surveillance in the Time of Insecurity*, Torin Monahan (2010) interrogates contemporary "security cultures", which define threats and the appropriate responses to them and produce an insecurity on an individual level to be sublimated through the consumption of security goods. Finally, readers are encouraged to reference the edited volume, *Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies*, edited by Kirstie Ball, Kevin Haggerty, and David Lyon (2012), which provides an excellent collection of writings from leading researchers in the field, including a personal history of engagement with surveillance studies (Marx 2012).

Security studies has evolved considerably since the 1980s. The field was initially defined by a "political realist" approach that emphasized the national security of nation-states against military threats and economic competition (Williams 2012). The work of Barry Buzan (1983) and the Copenhagen School served to expand the field by considering security not only in terms of states but human collectivities and the necessary conditions for human security. The Copenhagen School also emphasizes the social constructivist nature of security with the concept of "securitization", through which "an intersubjective understanding is constructed within the political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object" (Buzan and Waever 2003: 491). Didier Bigo (2008) more recently introduces the concept of the "ban-

opticon”. This refers to security practices consisting of discourses, architectures, and measures that support exceptionalism in the use of force, the exclusion of certain groups from society, and the securitization of free flows of goods, capital, information, and privileged individuals. Bigo’s work builds upon Foucault’s (2007) lectures on *Security, Territory, and Population*, which presents security as a distinct mode of governance. This mode is imbued with an economic logic prioritizing free markets and a modest role for the state, which serves as the other side of the governance coin where institutions with “negative functions,” such as the modern police and prisons, are found. General surveys of the field by Williams (2012) and Collins (2013) are useful introductions to the range of issues and perspectives in security studies.

Globalization itself is reflected in a more expansive body of literature that is difficult to summarize easily. Among a handful of influential works describing the unique characteristics of global society and the processes supporting its expansion are Zygmunt Baumann’s (2001) *Liquid Modernity* and Arjun Appadurai’s (1996) *Modernity at Large.* These emphasize the contemporary fluidity of industrial production, labor, consumption, populations, communications, and group and personal identity relative to modernity. Frameworks for understanding the rise of globalization are offered by theorists such as Anthony Giddens and Manuel Castells. Gidden’s (1993) notion of time space distanciation through the storage of material or allocative resources (agriculture, irrigation, industrial production) and of authoritative resources (retention and control of information) helps explain the expansion and patterning of particular social arrangements. Time space distanciation lends itself to questioning whether globalization is a new phenomenon or a continuation of earlier cultural and technological trends (Ritzer and Dean 2015). Castells’ (1996) notion of informationalism, a mode of development where the action of knowledge upon knowledge itself serves as a main source of productivity,

helps distinguish contemporary globalization from earlier phases. Hardt and Negri's (2000) *Empire* offers another approach for understanding globalization. They build upon post-structuralist theory, viewing globalization as a "biopolitical machine" whose economy consists of communicative labor (mobile communications), symbolic analysis and problem solving (algorithms), and affective labor (media communications) and whose political form is increasingly detached from the sovereign nation-state. Helpful surveys of the field can be found in Ritzer and Dean's (2015) *Globalization: A Basic Text* and Eitzen and Zinn's *Globalization: The Transformation of Social Worlds*.

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Notes

[i] Gary T. Marx, for instance, defines surveillance as "scrutiny through the use of technical means to extract or create personal or group data, whether from individuals or contexts," carefully choosing "the verb 'scrutinize' rather than 'observe' [to] call attention to the fact that contemporary forms often go beyond the visual image to involve sound, smell, motion, numbers, and words" (2016). David Lyon uses the term to refer to "any collection or processing of personal data, whether identifiable or not, for the purposes of influencing or managing those whose data have been garnered" (2001). Torin Monahan, studies "surveillance systems…that afford control of people through the identification, tracking, monitoring, or analysis of individuals, data, or systems" (2010). And Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson describe a "surveillant assemblage" that "operates by abstracting human bodies from their territorial settings, and separating them into a series of discrete flows…these flows are then reassembled in different locations as discrete and virtual 'data doubles'" (2000).

[ii] Since 2015, the following national legislation has been passed: the Investigatory Powers Act (IPA) in the UK, the Communications Intelligence Gathering Act in Germany, the International Electronic Communications Law in France, the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act in the US, the Yarovaya Law in Russia, to name just a few. The European measures target the surveillance of foreign communications, while the US law encourages companies to share information on "cybersecurity threats" with the government and the Russia law requires telecommunication companies to store and share with the government personal data related to security threats.

[iii] The state may use extralegal force against unions, gangs, or political opponents, or elements of the state may use organized crime to enrich themselves. Crime syndicates seek protection by buying off state actors. Violence may serve as a means of conflict resolution where more formal legal channels are not available (Arias and Goldstein 2010). These "violent multiplicities" (Arias and Goldstein 2010)

demonstrate that the transitions to democratic rule accompanying globalization in many parts of the world has not brought with it a strong rule of law or civilian control of military forces, basic elements of democracy.

[iv] These include discovery, moves intended to find out if surveillance is in operation and where it is; avoidance, moves to follow the discovery that surveillance is present and involve self-regulation; piggy back moves, where the surveillance is directly faced rather than avoided by accompanying or being attached to a legitimate subject or object, and blocking and masking moves, which seek to physically block access to the communication or, if unable or unwilling to do that, to render it (or aspects of it such as the identity, appearance or location of the communicator) unusable.