

# The Dark Side of Subjective Value in Sequential Negotiations: The Mediating Role of Pride and Anger

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Scholars who study negotiation increasingly recognize the importance of social context, seeing negotiations not merely as 1-shot interactions but as influenced by what came before. Under this longitudinal conceptualization of negotiation, a number of recent studies demonstrate that social psychological outcomes from prior negotiations are positively related to economic performance in subsequent negotiations when negotiating repeatedly with the same counterpart. In this report, we investigate a counterexample in the context of “sequential negotiations,” which we define as multiple negotiation sessions that occur within a short time frame but facing *different* counterparts in each session. We theorize, in sequential negotiations, that subjective value from 1 negotiation should be negatively related to objective outcomes in a subsequent negotiation because of spillover effects of incidental anger and pride. We test this model in 2 studies: a multiround lab study with a student sample and a longitudinal field study with employees negotiating as part of their jobs. Results from both studies support the hypothesized negative relationship between subjective value from an initial negotiation and the objective outcome from a subsequent negotiation with a different counterpart. The mediating role of pride is supported partially in Study 1 and fully in Study 2, whereas the mediating role of anger is not supported in either study. We discuss implications for negotiation theory and practice.

*Keywords:* sequential negotiations, subjective value, objective outcome, pride, anger

*Pride goeth before destruction, and a haughty spirit before a fall.*  
—Proverbs 16:18

Interpersonal negotiation is a fundamental process, underlying everyday relationships within dyads, groups, and organizations (Kolb & Williams, 2003). Yet much of the empirical research considered foundational to the negotiation field has treated negotiations as discrete, one-shot tasks, using the framework of multi-party decision-making (Hüffmeier, Krumm, & Hertel, 2011; Nash, 1953). While this framework helped to motivate decades of research on negotiation from a decision-analytic perspective (for reviews, see Neale & Bazerman, 1991, 1992), many contemporary scholars have called for a more social psychological, longitudinal approach to the study of negotiation (e.g., Adair & Olekalns, 2013; Barley, 1990; Bazerman, Curhan, & Moore, 2001; Bendersky & McGinn, 2010; Gelfand & Gal, 2012). For example, Gelfand and Gal (2012, p. 445) challenged researchers to “reconceptualize negotiations from largely one-shot, delimited interactions to a view

of negotiations as involving many actors over networks, over time, and over space.”

Gradually, researchers have begun to incorporate social factors, such as emotions, relationships, and culture, into the study of negotiation (for reviews, see Bazerman et al., 2001; Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000). Yet the vast majority of studies examining long-term consequences in negotiation tend to be among people interacting repeatedly with the same counterpart. For example, in a longitudinal field study, Curhan, Elfenbein, and Kilduff (2009) found that social psychological outcomes of employment negotiations at the time of hire tend to be positively associated with compensation satisfaction, job satisfaction, and turnover intentions with the same employer over a year later. Earlier research on psychological contracts (e.g., Robinson & Rousseau, 1994) and relationship marketing (e.g., Dabholkar, Johnston, & Cathey, 1994; Weitz & Bradford, 1999) similarly focus on positive effects within continuing relationships among the same parties over time. Most relevant to the current investigation, Curhan, Elfenbein, and Eisenkraft (2010) found that social psychological outcomes from a prior negotiation are positively associated with economic outcomes in a subsequent negotiation with the same counterpart.

The current research contributes to this growing body of longitudinal studies by exploring the phenomenon of *sequential negotiations*, which we define as engaging in multiple negotiations within a relatively short period of time facing *different* counterparts in each negotiation. Unlike in repeated negotiations, where affective responses are informative and relevant to subsequent negotiations with the same counterpart, in sequential negotiations individuals generally should not carry forward emotions from one

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negotiation to next because the feelings from the prior negotiation may not be applicable or relevant to the new situation.

Our research advances theory in four important ways. First, whereas most prior research on negotiation has focused on isolated, one-shot interactions (Bendersky & McGinn, 2010; Hüffmeier et al., 2011), we examine associations across time from one negotiation to the next. Second, although prior research has found that subjective outcomes at Time 1 are positively associated with objective outcomes at Time 2 (e.g., Curhan et al., 2010), this was in the context of repeated negotiations with the same counterpart. By contrast, we hypothesize the opposite effect in the context of sequential negotiations with different counterparts, such that subjective outcomes at Time 1 are *negatively* related to objective outcomes at Time 2. Third, we test potential mechanisms for this effect by examining the mediating role of two discrete emotions. Finally, to maximize internal and external validity, we present two studies: a multiround lab study with a student sample and a longitudinal field study with employees who were negotiating as part of their jobs. This mixed-method approach is rare in the field of negotiation but important for narrowing the practitioner-researcher divide (Hüffmeier et al., 2011).

### Sequential Negotiations

Sequential negotiations occur when an individual engages in multiple negotiations within a relatively short time frame facing different counterparts in each negotiation. Sequential negotiations are different from repeated negotiations, which involve multiple negotiations with the same counterpart over successive rounds. Sequential negotiations have received scant attention in extant research on negotiation, although they are quite common in many occupations, such as among purchasing agents, sales representatives, corporate recruiters, lawyers, sports agents, and a subset of human resources professionals (Elfatry & Layzell, 2002; O'Connor, Arnold, & Burris, 2005). Most professions of course involve a combination of sequential and repeated negotiations, depending on whether a person is negotiating with a new client, supplier, or vendor versus reengaging with an old one (Watkins, 1999).

Our distinction between sequential and repeated interactions is analogous to a distinction made in the literature on interactive decision-making and game theory. Research on game theory has referred to repeated interactions with the same counterpart as “constant matching” or “fixed pairings” whereas it refers to sequential interactions with different counterparts as “random or stranger matching” (Camerer, 2003; Duffy & Ochs, 2009). In constant matching games, there is a “shadow of the future,” which allows for the possibility that players may reward or punish each other in subsequent rounds, leading to a stable strategy of mutual cooperation (Axelrod, 1984, p. 124; Dixit & Skeath, 2004; Heide & Miner, 1992). By contrast, with random matching, rational players should view each interaction as an independent, one-shot game, and stable cooperation should not emerge (Nash, 1953). Nonetheless, experimental results suggest that cooperation can still emerge in random-matching if sufficient information or communication is available (Camera & Casari, 2009; Gächter & Herrmann, 2009). More importantly for our study, the nature of one’s experience with a prior counterpart often spills over into how one

behaves in a subsequent encounter with a new counterpart (Pey-sakhovich & Rand, 2016; Sheldon, 1999).

Although interactive decisions in games are quite different from actual negotiations that involve richer communication and multiple rounds of offers and counteroffers, we argue that a similar distinction should be made in the negotiation literature. Repeated negotiations afford multiple opportunities for the development of behavioral patterns and reciprocity (Curhan et al., 2010; Lawler & Yoon, 1993). In a repeated negotiation, individuals can use the past behavior of their counterparts as an indicator of their counterpart’s likely behavior in the current negotiation. If both parties were cooperative and trusting in early negotiations, both likely are justified to be even more cooperative and trusting in later negotiations, which facilitates information sharing and joint value creation (Curhan et al., 2010; Drolet & Morris, 2000; O’Connor et al., 2005; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Valley, Neale, & Mannix, 1995). By contrast, if one individual’s trusting behavior was not reciprocated by his or her counterpart, then the individual should respond by becoming more competitive and less trusting in the next negotiation, following the classic tit-for-tat strategy (Dixit & Skeath, 2004). This strategy is adaptive for repeated negotiations with the same counterpart but problematic in sequential negotiations, because previous negotiations do not provide a reliable indicator of the behavior of a new negotiation counterpart. In sequential negotiations, the counterparts change with each session and neither party is aware of how the other behaved in the previous negotiation. Nevertheless, just like in random matching studies, parties in a sequential negotiation run the risk of overgeneralizing from their own experience with a prior counterpart or letting their emotions from that prior experience spill over into a subsequent experience with a new counterpart. This is the main feature of sequential negotiations that we explore in the current investigation.

### Subjective Value in Sequential Negotiations

The primary contribution of this investigation is to understand how social psychological outcomes from one negotiation affect economic outcomes in a subsequent negotiation with a different counterpart. To operationalize social psychological and economic outcomes, we draw from prior research by Curhan, Elfenbein, and Xu (2006), who mapped the domain of “subjective value,” which refers to the “social, perceptual, and emotional” outcome of a negotiation (p. 494), as contrasted with the objective outcome, which refers to the explicit terms of the deal.<sup>1</sup> The construct and measure of subjective value validated by Curhan et al. (2006) includes feelings about the instrumental outcome (e.g., being satisfied with the terms of the deal), feelings about the self (e.g., not “losing face”), feelings about the negotiation process (e.g., perceiving the process as fair), and feelings about the relationship (e.g., having a positive impression of one’s counterpart). Although these four factors relate to different theoretical constructs (e.g., outcome satisfaction, justice, trust), they are highly intercorrelated,

<sup>1</sup> Following prior research by Curhan and colleagues (e.g., Curhan et al., 2006, 2008, 2010), we use the term “social psychological outcomes” to refer to the general domain or category of intangible or socioemotional factors (such as attitudes, feelings, and relationships) that may result from a negotiation, whereas we use the term “subjective value” to refer to Curhan et al.’s (2006) specific, validated, multifaceted construct and measure of social psychological outcomes.

and the reliability of the overarching construct, referred to as “global subjective value,” tends to be quite high ( $\alpha = .91$ ; Curhan et al., 2006).

In the following sections, we develop our hypotheses (illustrated in Figure 1) regarding the effects of subjective value on sequential negotiations. We begin with the affect-as-information perspective (Clore, Gasper, & Garvin, 2001), which suggests that subjective value from one negotiation could have carryover effects on objective outcomes from a subsequent negotiation. However, recent research suggests that this general valence approach lacks the precision to capture the more nuanced effects of specific emotional responses. Therefore, in addition to deriving hypotheses based on general affect, we also draw on the appraisal theory of emotion (Lazarus, 1991) to incorporate discrete emotions as a mechanism for more proximal spillover effects. For example, low subjective value may give rise to negative emotions, such as anger (Gelfand, Major, Raver, Nishii, & O’Brien, 2006; Allred, 1999), and foster greater determination in a subsequent negotiation. Conversely, high subjective value may give rise to positive emotions, such as pride (Butt & Choi, 2006) and foster overconfidence or complacency in a subsequent negotiation. While these emotional responses may be justified and appropriate in a repeated negotiation with the same counterpart, we predict that in sequential negotiations there will be a *negative* relationship between subjective value from one negotiation and objective outcomes in a subsequent negotiation with a new counterpart.

### Subjective Value and Subsequent Objective Outcomes

Subjective value constitutes an affective reaction to a negotiation settlement (Curhan et al., 2006; Gelfand et al., 2006; Oliver, Balakrishnan, & Barry, 1994) and therefore should be subject to affective processes. The affect-as-information perspective suggest that people tend to use their affective states as barometers of the world around them (Damasio, Everitt, & Bishop, 1996; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). These subjective, often nonconscious, affective states subsequently influence cognition, judgment, and behavior. For example, positive affect generally gives rise to judgments of success and liking (Clore et al., 2001). Those subsequent cognitions can be informative and helpful when they are relevant to the situation at hand (Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Clore et al., 2001). In repeated negotiations, one’s initial affect and emotions

are informative early indicators of incipient relationships that will continue into the next negotiation (Gelfand et al., 2006). For example, low subjective value in a repeated negotiation may foreshadow a negative spiral of distrust and poor communication, whereas high subjective value in a repeated negotiation is often a sign that rapport is strong and likely to foster future value creation (Drolet & Morris, 2000; O’Connor et al., 2005). Indeed, research by Curhan et al. (2010) showed that positive subjective value from an initial negotiation predicted better objective outcomes in a subsequent negotiation with the same counterpart, and this effect was primarily evident for value creation.

By contrast, in sequential negotiations rational individuals should treat each negotiation as a new experience and generally should not carry forward their feelings and expectations from previous negotiations unless they convey an advantage. However, the affect-as-information perspective predicts that individuals tend to misattribute their feelings to other proximal parties and situations (Clore et al., 2001), which can give rise to cognitive and behavioral tendencies that are inappropriate for the next negotiation. In other words, subjective value from one negotiation can spill over to the next negotiation and lead negotiators to adjust their behaviors in ways that may not be appropriate for the new situation. For example, if subjective value from an initial negotiation is high, the negotiator is apt to feel at ease and confident (Clore et al., 2001; Curhan et al., 2010). Any spillover of these feelings from a prior negotiation may be inappropriate in a subsequent negotiation with a new counterpart, who may or may not be as accommodating as the first. For these reasons, we would expect positive subjective value to lead to lower objective performance in a subsequent negotiation with a different counterpart.

Conversely, if subjective value from an initial negotiation is low, this negative affective experience may give rise to judgments of failure and frustration (Clore et al., 2001). As a result, the negotiator will likely compensate through a more determined and selfish approach to a second negotiation (O’Connor et al., 2005). This kind of compensatory behavior might be undertaken either to bolster a damaged self-identity (Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 1996; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982) or simply to maintain progress toward a performance goal (Fishbach, Zhang, & Koo, 2009; Vancouver & Kendall, 2006). Previous research has shown that negative affect leads to more aggressive offers and more competitive tactics (Forgas, 1998). Whereas, in repeated negotiations competitive or aggressive tactics may undermine ongoing relationships and value creation (Barry & Oliver, 1996; Thompson, Wang, & Gunia, 2010), in sequential negotiations aggressive tactics may be effective, especially regarding the value claiming dimension of negotiation (O’Connor et al., 2005). As a consequence, low subjective value from an initial negotiation may lead to higher objective outcomes in a subsequent negotiation with a different counterpart.

Therefore, based on the affect-as-information perspective we propose that in sequential negotiations, the relationship between subjective value and subsequent objective outcomes will be negative. Therefore, we make the following prediction:

*Hypothesis 1:* Subjective value resulting from an initial negotiation will be negatively related to objective outcomes of a subsequent negotiation with a different counterpart.




Figure 1. Theoretical model of subjective value in sequential negotiations.

## The Mediating Role of Discrete Emotions

The theory underlying Hypothesis 1 involves different effects for positive and negative affective states arising from high and low subjective value, respectively, but does not necessarily implicate discrete emotions. With the rapid expansion of emotions research, it has become clear that the valence approach of affect-as-information breaks down for proximal, high arousal events (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). For example, it was widely believed that positive affect expands thinking, while negative affect narrows thinking (Fredrickson, 1998). However, more recent research suggests that some discrete negative emotions broaden thinking, while some positive emotions narrow it (Harmon-Jones, Gable, & Price, 2013). Because Hypothesis 1 subsumes unique effects of high and low subjective value, we draw on appraisal theory of emotion (Lazarus, 1991) to develop two complementary mediation paths (one for high subjective value and one for low subjective value) through two separate discrete emotions that are likely to arise in negotiations and play pivotal roles in the predicted spillover effects.

The appraisal theory of emotion suggests which emotions are most likely to result from evaluations of an event and the cognitive and behavioral tendencies that each emotion triggers (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991). Specifically, we propose that the emotions of anger and pride will help explain the negative relationship between subjective value and subsequent objective outcomes in sequential negotiations. We begin with anger and pride because, as we will argue, these two emotions should be the most likely emotions that result from the negotiation appraisal process. In addition, anger and pride play a key role in the experience and evaluation of work events, such as negotiations (Damasio et al., 1996; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996).

The appraisal process begins with a primary appraisal of whether an event is goal congruent or incongruent (Lazarus, 1991). This is similar to the role of valence in the affect-as-information perspective in that goal congruent events elicit positive emotions, whereas goal incongruent events elicit negative emotions. In the context of negotiation, the individual considers objective and subjective cues to assess whether their goals were advanced or not. Therefore, a high subjective value should trigger positive emotions and low subjective value should trigger negative emotions. The specific emotion elicited by high or low subjective value is determined by a series of secondary appraisals of the event regarding attributions of credit and blame. In dyadic negotiations, a number of cognitive biases (such as the actor-observer hypothesis, fundamental attribution error, and self-serving bias) are likely to predispose secondary attributions in predictable ways (Malle, 2006; Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004; Ross, 1977). As we will demonstrate, these attributions proceed differently for negative (low subjective value) and positive (high subjective value) events.

**Low subjective value.** When subjective value is low, the negotiation is perceived as a negative event. Self-serving bias suggests that individuals will tend to attribute this failure to external causes and the actions of others for blocking their goals (Mezulis et al., 2004). When evaluating the negative actions of others, the actor-observer hypothesis and the fundamental attribution error suggest that individuals will tend to attribute others' unfavorable actions to internal, dispositional causes (Malle, 2006;

Ross, 1977). According to appraisal theory, this pattern of appraisal should give rise to anger (Lazarus, 1991). Therefore, low subjective value should be positively related to anger. Consistent with our arguments, anger is one of the most widely studied emotions in negotiations (Allred, 1999; Daly, 1991; Fox & Spector, 1999; Kreibig, 2010).

Appraisal theory also suggests that discrete emotions have specific cognitive and behavioral tendencies for coping with the situation that evoked them (Lazarus, 1991). However, emotions persist and may also spill over and influence the individual in subsequent situations. Anger involves an assessment that the other party is purposefully thwarting our goals, and it tends to trigger a high level of ego-defense (Lazarus, 1991). As a result, anger motivates the individual to get back at the other party and to adopt strategies to restore personal success. Anger tends to narrow cognitive processing and suppress empathy (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). Research has shown that anger can have positive effects on short-term objective outcomes in negotiation, especially regarding value claiming. For example, anger tends to be associated with greater concessions from counterparts (Butt, Choi, & Jaeger, 2005; Sinaeur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004) even while it may undermine value creation (O'Connor et al., 2005).<sup>2</sup> Therefore, we postulate that anger will mediate the effect of subjective value on subsequent objective value.

*Hypothesis 2:* Anger resulting from an initial negotiation will mediate the positive effect of low subjective value from an initial negotiation on objective outcomes of a subsequent negotiation with a different counterpart.

**High subjective value.** High subjective value reflects a reflects a perception that the negotiation was a positive event, and therefore the pattern of appraisals will tend to proceed in a different fashion than for low subjective value. For positive events, self-serving bias suggest that individuals will tend to attribute success to their own actions (Mezulis et al., 2004). Likewise, the actor-observer hypothesis suggests that individuals will tend to make secondary appraisals that credit their own internal dispositions and characteristics. According to appraisal theory, this pattern of appraisals should give rise to the emotion of pride (Lazarus, 1991; Tracy & Robins, 2007). Therefore, high subjective value should be positively associated with pride.

Lazarus (1991) equated pride with ego-enhancement by taking credit for success or achievement and suggested that the action tendency of pride is to revel in and call attention to one's success.<sup>3</sup> Pride tends to arise from a dominance-oriented perspective that the focal individual is generally superior to others in the realm under consideration (Tracy & Robins, 2004). Pride tends to foster feelings of superiority, overconfidence, and rigid thinking (Fishbach et al., 2009; Tracy & Robins, 2004; Vancouver & Kendall, 2006;

<sup>2</sup> Some studies (e.g., Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, & Salomon, 1999) have found negative effects of anger on performance in negotiation, but other research suggests that anger is only detrimental to short-term performance in negotiation when the target of the anger has more power than the person displaying the anger (Passarelli, 2014).

<sup>3</sup> More recently, researchers have distinguished between "authentic" and "hubristic" pride (Lewis, 2000; Tracy & Robins, 2004). However, Lazarus's definition of pride equates to "hubristic" as opposed to "authentic" pride.

Verbeke, Belschak, & Bagozzi, 2004). In the negotiation context, pride should have negative consequences for a subsequent sequential negotiation (Lea & Webley, 1997; Gelfand, Fulmer, & Severance, 2010). Overconfidence and inflexible thinking should lead the negotiator to underestimate their new counterpart, prepare inadequately, and be slow to adapt their strategy from the previous negotiation. These behaviors should be detrimental for negotiating with a new counterpart. In their emotion-based model of the negotiation process, Butt and Choi (2006) found a positive association between negotiator satisfaction and pride, but a negative association between pride and objective outcomes. As a result, we predict that pride will mediate the effect of subjective value on subsequent objective outcomes.

*Hypothesis 3:* Pride resulting from an initial negotiation will mediate the negative effect of high subjective value from an initial negotiation on objective outcomes of a subsequent negotiation with a different counterpart.

## Overview of Studies

We test our theoretical model by exploring sequential negotiations in the lab and in the field. In Study 1, we conducted a sequential negotiation simulation where undergraduate business students engaged in four rounds of a mixed-motive negotiation, facing a different counterpart in each round. This research design represents a controlled setting with structurally equivalent negotiations, random assignment of counterparts, and clean measures of objective outcomes and subjective value. In Study 2, we describe a field study in a privately held transportation company, where employees negotiated fuel prices sequentially with hundreds of different suppliers over a 4-week period. This second study provides a conceptual replication with real-world outcomes.

### Study 1: Lab Test of Subjective Value in Sequential Negotiations

As an initial test of our model, we constructed a situation involving a series of hypothetical negotiations where participants faced a different counterpart in each round.

## Method

**Participants and procedure.** Undergraduate students in their third or fourth year in a southwestern business school participated in partial fulfillment of a course requirement for a section on negotiation in courses on organizational behavior and leadership. The study protocol was approved by the TCU Institutional Review Board (1404-67-1404, Class Surveys & Exercises). This sample consisted of 158 participants. Of these, one participant was dropped from the sample because of excessive missing data. Therefore, the final sample included 157 individuals engaging in a total of 628 negotiations. Fifty-one percent of the participants were men.

Participants were randomly divided into buyers and sellers and engaged in a mixed-motive retail sales negotiation task (Bazerman, Magliozzi, & Neale, 1985; Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984). To make the negotiations general and realistic, we selected a task with multiple issues (three in this case) and with both integrative (Froman & Cohen, 1970; Pruitt, 1983) and distributive (fixed sum) issues (two

integrative one distributive). Each issue had nine options (A-I), with variable values for each party based on a payout schedule. Participants did not know the payout schedule for the other party and were instructed to refer only to issues and option letters, not their payouts, during negotiations.

Participants engaged in four sequential negotiations with a different negotiation counterpart each time. After each round of negotiations, minor changes were made to the payout schedules in subsequent rounds so that participants would not know the other party's outcome schedules going into the new negotiation. For each negotiation, participants had five minutes to reach a mutual agreement. While this time limit was somewhat shorter than other lab experiments, it matched the average negotiation time in Study 2. If no agreement was reached at the end of that time, both parties received an outcome of zero. After an agreement was reached, both individuals recorded the outcome, completed a short survey, and prepared for the next negotiation with a new counterpart. Participants were incentivized with a nonmonetary prize based on scores earned in the exercise.

**Measures.** We measured feelings of *anger* using a two-item measure (Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O'Connor, 1987). The items were "I feel angry" and "I feel resentful." We measured feelings of pride using a single item: "I feel proud." We assessed subjective value with the shortened version of the Subjective Value Inventory (SVI) used by Curhan et al. (2009). To further shorten the time between negotiation rounds we dropped the four self-focused items (leaving a total of nine items).<sup>4</sup> All responses were on seven-point scales, anchored by 1 ("not at all") and 7 ("a great deal"). A sample item is: "How satisfied are you with your own outcome—i.e., the extent to which the terms of your agreement (or lack of agreement) benefit you?" Following Curhan et al. (2009) as well as Brown and Curhan (2013; see also De Pauw, Venter, & Neethling, 2011), we averaged these items into a single composite measure of global subjective value.<sup>5</sup> The coefficient alpha reliability of the measure was .92. We used the simulated monetary outcome for the focal negotiator, based on the negotiated terms and outcome schedule, as the objective outcome measure for each negotiation.

**Control variables.** Considerable evidence indicates that gender can influence negotiators' objective outcomes (e.g., Haselhuhn & Kray, 2012) and their subjective value (Elfenbein, Curhan, Eisenkraft, Shirako, & Baccaro, 2008). Therefore, we included gender as an individual-level control. We also controlled for objective outcome in the previous negotiation to ensure that results were not because of regression toward the mean (Stigler, 1997).

## Results

Descriptive statistics for Study 1 variables appear in Table 1. Objective outcome was positively related to subjective value from the same negotiation round,  $r = .40, p < .01$ . In Study 1, individual negotiations were nested within negotiators. Failing to account for the nested nature of our data could produce misleading,

<sup>4</sup>Curhan et al. (2010) found that the self items were unrelated to economic outcomes in subsequent negotiations.

<sup>5</sup>The pattern of results held for both studies when the global measure of subjective value was replaced with each of the subdimensions of subjective value.

Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations for Study 1 Variables

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4
Negotiation level (L1)						
1. Objective outcome	2.74	.59				
2. Subjective value	4.63	1.16	.40**	(.92)		
3. Anger	2.25	1.47	-.26**	-.60**	(.96)	
4. Pride	3.73	1.70	.24**	.40**	-.20**	
Individual level (L2)						
5. Gender	.51	.50	.04	.06	.00	.24**

Note.  $N_{L1} = 612$ .  $N_{L2} = 157$ . Coefficient alpha appears along the diagonal. Objective outcome was scaled to thousands of simulated dollars. Gender was coded as 1 for male and 0 for female.

\*\*  $p < .01$ .

or even inaccurate, conclusions (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Therefore, we used hierarchical linear modeling (HLM; Bryk & Raudenbush, 1996). We group-mean-centered anger, pride, and subjective value so that these values represented departures from how each individual typically felt (Enders & Tofghi, 2007; Hofmann & Gavin, 1998). We did not center objective outcomes because an outcome of zero had a specific meaning (failure to reach an agreement).

Hypothesis 1 proposed that subjective value resulting from one negotiation would carry over and have negative consequences for objective outcome in a subsequent negotiation with a new negotiation counterpart. Model 1 of Table 2 presents the results of the HLM that tested this prediction. The results indicate that subjective value from the previous negotiation had a significant, negative effect on objective outcomes in the next negotiation ( $\gamma = -.08$ ,  $p < .05$ ). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was supported.

As a supplementary analysis, we repeated the above tests for value creation and value claiming separately. Following common practice (e.g., Curhan, Neale, Ross, & Rosencranz-Engelmann, 2008; Loewenstein, Morris, Chakravarti, Thompson, & Kopelman, 2005), we constructed two additional variables—*joint points* was the sum of the focal negotiator's points plus the counterpart's

points and *points differential* was the difference between the focal negotiator's points and the counterpart's points. The effect of subjective value on joint points was only marginally significant ( $\gamma = -.06$ ,  $p < .10$ ), whereas the effect of subjective value on points differential was statistically significant and twice as strong ( $\gamma = -.12$ ,  $p < .05$ ). This result suggests that the relationship between subjective value and objective outcome was primarily because of value claiming.

Hypothesis 2 predicted that anger from the previous negotiation would mediate the relationship between subjective value from the previous negotiation and objective outcomes from a subsequent negotiation. Model 1 of Table 3 shows that subjective value from a negotiation was significantly related to feelings of anger following that negotiation ( $\gamma = -.62$ ,  $p < .01$ ). However, Model 2 of Table 2 shows that anger from the previous negotiation was not significantly related to the objective outcome of the next negotiation. Therefore, anger did not mediate the relationship between subjective value and objective outcome from a subsequent negotiation, and thus Hypothesis 2 was not supported.

Hypothesis 3 predicted that pride from the previous negotiation would mediate the relationship between subjective value from the previous negotiation and objective outcomes in a subsequent negotiation. Model 2 of Table 3 shows that subjective value from a negotiation was significantly related to feelings of pride ( $\gamma = .48$ ,  $p < .01$ ). However, Model 2 of Table 2 shows that pride from the previous negotiation did not have a significant effect on the objective outcome of the next negotiation, indicating that Hypothesis 3 was not supported. Nevertheless, because pride was significantly related to gender (i.e., as shown in Table 1—i.e., men reported greater feelings of pride after their negotiation than did women), we investigated whether the mediating role of pride may have been conditional upon gender. Model 3 of Table 2 shows a significant cross-level interaction between gender and pride from a previous negotiation ( $\gamma = -.14$ ,  $p < .05$ ), predicting objective outcome in the next negotiation. Figure 2 depicts this conditional effect graphically. Tests of the simple slopes show that the relationship between pride and outcome was significant for men ( $s = -.10$ ,  $p <$

Table 2  
Study 1 Multilevel Regressions Predicting Objective Outcome in Next Negotiation

Variable	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	$\gamma$	<i>SE</i>	$\gamma$	<i>SE</i>	$\gamma$	<i>SE</i>
Intercept ( $\gamma_{00}$ )	2.20**	.21	2.10**	.13	2.16**	.14
Level 1						
Previous objective outcome ( $\gamma_{10}$ )	.19**	.05	.22**	.04	.20**	.05
Previous subjective value ( $\gamma_{20}$ )	-.08*	.04	-.08	.05	-.08	.05
Previous anger ( $\gamma_{30}$ )			.03	.05	-.02	.05
Previous pride ( $\gamma_{40}$ )			-.03	.03	.03	.04
Level 2						
Gender ( $\gamma_{01}$ )	.05	.05	.05	.05	.05	.05
Cross-level interaction						
Previous Pride $\times$ Gender ( $\gamma_{41}$ )					-.14*	.06
$\sigma^2$	.35		.33		.33	
Level 1 pseudo- $R^2$	.02		.10		.11	
Level 2 pseudo- $R^2$	.08		.23		.24	

Note.  $\gamma$  = unstandardized coefficient obtained from hierarchical linear modeling (HLM).  $N_{L1} = 455$ .  $N_{L2} = 157$ . Objective outcome scaled to thousands of simulated dollars. Gender coded as 1 for male and 0 for female.  
\*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ .

Table 3  
Study 1 Multilevel Regressions Predicting Anger and Pride

Variable	Model 1: Anger		Model 2: Pride	
	$\gamma$	SE	$\gamma$	SE
Intercept ( $\gamma_{00}$ )	2.52**	.25	2.31**	.33
Level 1				
Objective outcome ( $\gamma_{10}$ )	-.10	.08	.39**	.11
Subjective value ( $\gamma_{20}$ )	-.62**	.05	.48**	.07
Level 2				
Gender ( $\gamma_{01}$ )	.00	.16	.64**	.20
$\sigma^2$	.68		1.16	
Level 1 pseudo- $R^2$	.23		.13	
Level 2 pseudo- $R^2$	.11		.08	

Note.  $\gamma$  = unstandardized coefficient obtained from hierarchical linear modeling (HLM).  $N_{L1}$  = 612.  $N_{L2}$  = 157. Objective outcome scaled to thousands of simulated dollars. Gender coded as 1 for male and 0 for female.

\*\*  $p < .01$ .

.05) but not for women. We employed [Tofighi and MacKinnon \(2011\)](#) RMediation package to estimate a 95% confidence interval (CI) around the indirect effect of subjective value through pride. This method is recommended for testing mediation effects in multilevel models ([Zhang, Zyphur, & Preacher, 2009](#)). The results indicated that the indirect effect through pride was significant for men because the confidence interval (CI; 95% CI [-.13, -.01]) did not contain zero. In contrast, the indirect effect for women was not significant. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was partially supported; pride from the previous negotiation mediated the effect of subjective value on objective outcome in the next negotiation for men but not for women. We also tested for a similar conditional effect of anger but did not find one.

## Discussion

Study 1 provided full support for the predicted direct effect but only partial support for the indirect effects. Our basic prediction was confirmed in that subjective value from one negotiation was negatively associated with the objective outcome of the next negotiation with a different counterpart (Hypothesis 1). Supplementary analyses suggested this negative effect was due primarily to value claiming, which differs from research on repeated negotiations where findings tend to be due primarily to value creation ([Curhan et al., 2010](#)). This distinction is important because one of the main mechanisms for a beneficial role of subjective value is relational—that is, mutual liking and rapport facilitate information sharing and value creation ([Drolet & Morris, 2000](#); [O'Connor et al., 2005](#))—whereas sequential negotiations do not afford opportunities to capitalize on enhanced relationships because counterparts change in each subsequent negotiation. Indeed, it may be that some of the same spillover dynamics we see here in sequential negotiations are operating in repeated negotiations as well, but swamped by the relationship effects and the shadow of the future.

In exploring discrete emotions as potential mechanisms, we found no evidence for the mediating role of anger (Hypothesis 2) but mixed evidence for the mediating role of pride (Hypothesis 3). Namely, for men, pride mediated the relationship between subjective value and subsequent objective outcomes, whereas for women, pride did not mediate the relationship. This gender differ-

ence was not predicted, but is consistent with previous findings that women tend to report less pride than men in the context of positive situations or achievements ([Kitayama, Mesquita, & Karasawa, 2006](#); [Stipek & Gralinski, 1991](#)). It may also be that in this context females experienced more authentic pride whereas males experienced more hubristic pride ([Tracy & Robins, 2007](#)) or that females acted differently than males when they experienced pride.

## Study 2: Field Test of Subjective Value in Sequential Negotiations

While the findings of Study 1 partially supported our hypotheses, implications are somewhat limited by the hypothetical nature of the negotiations. We aimed therefore in Study 2 to improve external validity by exploring a conceptual replication in the field. Field studies are uncommon in the negotiation literature but essential for validating claims based on findings in the lab ([Buelens, Van De Woestyne, Mestdagh, & Bouckennooghe, 2008](#); [Hüffmeier et al., 2011](#)). Thus, in Study 2, we test our model in a work setting involving actual employees who were engaging in sequential negotiations as part of their regular job duties. Study 2 was primarily concerned with value claiming (i.e., the negotiations in Study 2 had little to no potential for integrative bargaining or value creation), which aligns with results of our supplementary analyses suggesting that effects in Study 1 were attributable primarily to the distributive component of the negotiations.

## Method

**Participants and procedure.** To confirm the results of Study 1 in the field, we investigated a work context in which individuals negotiated multiple times during each workday with different counterparts. The research site was a privately held company in the transportation industry. It had 50 employees and annual revenues of approximately \$180 million, though our study was only concerned with the 11 individuals whose primary job responsibility was to negotiate by telephone with fuel suppliers at locations throughout the United States. This sequential series of transactions involved a relatively large number of negotiation events nested within a smaller number of days. In addition, the days were further




Figure 2. Conditional effect of pride on outcome in next negotiation.

nested within employees. Data collection occurred over a 4-week period and was judged to be exempt from institutional review board review by the University of Arizona Institutional Review Board. Individual negotiators completed a short online survey immediately following each negotiation. The final sample consisted of 308 negotiations across 4 weeks. It is important that the unit of analysis for this study was the negotiation, as opposed to the workday or the individual. Fifty-five percent of employees were men. The average age was 30.55 years ( $SD = 10.62$ ), and the negotiators had an average tenure with the company of 1.83 years ( $SD = 1.35$ ). Employees did not specialize in negotiation per se, but each had been negotiating as part of their job for approximately 6 months because of a companywide change in the scope of their responsibilities.

During the course of each workday, each employee was periodically assigned to negotiate the price of fuel at a specific geographic location. The locations were determined externally, and the firm had to purchase fuel at each location. There were many locations across North America. The firm had price contracts for fuel at the most frequently visited locations, but these accounted for less than half the locations visited. Negotiations with the other locations were conducted through telephone conversations only. In each case, a publicly posted price for fuel was set internally by each supplier. During this time, the firm was attempting to negotiate the price of fuel at noncontracted locations, and it was the only firm attempting to do so. The negotiation was considered a success by the company if the employee obtained any discount below the posted price because the firm was more interested in establishing precedent than in the actual discounts achieved.

**Measures.** We used measures in the field study that were as consistent as possible with those used in the lab study. We determined the objective outcome of the negotiation from the organization's records.

We measured feelings of anger using a single-item measure taken from Shaver et al.'s (1987) emotion framework. The item was "I feel irritated." We measured feelings of pride using the item "I feel accomplished." We used these two single-item measures because the managers preferred them to the items used in Study 1. To measure subjective value, we used the same nine-item version of the SVI and response scale as in Study 1. The coefficient alpha reliability of this measure was .87.

We used a measure of the objective outcome that was economically important within the context for the study. Because employees were acting as agents, bargaining on behalf of the firm, they did not directly share in the profits of their negotiations. Rather, their performance appraisals were based only on whether they obtained a discount (of any size) in their negotiations. If the negotiator was able to obtain a discount below the publicly posted price (as set by that supplier), the employing firm considered the negotiation a win and, if not, considered it a loss. Therefore, we coded the outcome as 1 if a discount was obtained and 0 if not. The organization also recorded the results of each bargaining session in this manner. For this reason, judging the results in terms of "wins" and "losses" was meaningful to these negotiators. In addition, company policy was that the number of "wins" was the only objective indicator that had real-life consequences for the negotiators. We obtained this information from company records. The reason for this somewhat unusual state of affairs was that suppliers had operated on a take-it-or-leave-it pricing scheme in the past and

this firm was the first to attempt to negotiate prices by leveraging its relative volume of purchases. As such, any concession by the suppliers was considered more important than the magnitude of the discount negotiated. Management was closely tracking negotiation success because of the high-stakes, precedent-setting nature of these negotiations, and some employees were subsequently let go as a result of their poor negotiation performance.

**Control variables.** As in Study 1, we included negotiator gender and objective outcome in the previous negotiation as individual-level controls.

## Results

Descriptive statistics for Study 2 variables appear in Table 4. As noted previously, the structure of our sample required that the data be nested within three different hierarchical levels. Individual negotiations were nested within days, which were further nested within employees. To appropriately model these interrelationships, we again used multilevel modeling with HLM. In addition, we again group-mean-centered anger, pride, and subjective value at Level 1. We did not center objective outcome because it was dichotomous. None of the study variables were at Level 2, and Level 2 served only to nest negotiations within workdays. The individual-level control variable, gender, was included at Level 3. Because objective outcome in the next negotiation was a dichotomous dependent variable, these models were fit using multilevel Bernoulli estimation.

Again, Hypothesis 1 predicted that subjective value from one negotiation would have negative consequences for objective outcome in a subsequent negotiation. Model 1 of Table 5 shows that subjective value from the previous negotiation was negatively related to objective outcome in the next negotiation ( $\gamma = -.77$ ,  $p < .01$ ). The odds ratio indicated that a one-unit increase in subjective value reduced the odds of obtaining a discount in the following negotiation by a factor of .46, reducing the likelihood of a discount from 50% to 31%. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was once again supported.

Hypothesis 2 predicted that anger from the previous negotiation would mediate the relationship between subjective value from the previous negotiation and objective outcomes from a subsequent negotiation. Model 1 of Table 6 shows that subjective value from the first negotiation had a significant, negative effect on anger ( $\gamma = -.33$ ,  $p < .05$ ). However, Model 2 of Table 5 indicates that

Table 4  
*Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations for Study 2 Variables*

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4
Negotiation level (L1)						
1. Objective outcome	.37	.48				
2. Subjective value	3.99	1.67	.52**	(.87)		
3. Anger	2.03	1.81	-.30**	-.41**		
4. Pride	3.03	2.17	.48**	.76**	-.36**	
Individual level (L3)						
5. Gender	.61	.49	.15**	.31**	-.17**	.16**

Note.  $N_{L1} = 308$ .  $N_{L3} = 11$ . Coefficient alpha appears along the diagonal. Objective outcome coded as 1 if a discount was negotiated and 0 if not. Gender coded as 1 for male and 0 for female.

\*\*  $p < .01$ .



Table 5  
 Study 2 Multilevel Regressions Predicting Objective Outcome in Next Negotiation

Variable	Model 1			Model 2		
	$\gamma$	SE	OR	$\gamma$	SE	OR
Intercept ( $\gamma_{000}$ )	-1.32**	.36	.27	-1.21**	.36	.30
Level 1						
Previous objective outcome ( $\gamma_{100}$ )	1.31*	.52	3.69	1.41**	.47	4.10
Previous subjective value ( $\gamma_{200}$ )	-.77**	.23	.46	-.34	.34	.71
Previous anger ( $\gamma_{300}$ )				-.30	.24	.74
Previous pride ( $\gamma_{400}$ )				-.49*	.23	.61
Level 3						
Gender ( $\gamma_{001}$ )	.37	.43	1.44	.49	.49	1.63
-2LL	281			277		

Note. OR = odds ratio.  $N_{L1} = 20$ .  $N_{L2} = 107$ .  $N_{L3} = 11$ . Level 2 (days) does not contain any predictors but is included to reflect the nesting of the negotiations within days. Outcome coded as 1 if a discount was negotiated and 0 if not. Gender coded as 1 for male and 0 for female. Dichotomous outcome required multilevel Bernoulli regression models.

\*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ .

anger from the previous negotiation did not have a significant effect on the objective outcome in the next negotiation. Therefore, there was no evidence for the mediating role of anger and Hypothesis 2 was not supported.

Hypothesis 3 predicted that pride from the previous negotiation would mediate the relationship between subjective value from the previous negotiation and objective outcomes from a subsequent negotiation. Model 2 of Table 6 shows that subjective value from the first negotiation had a significant, positive effect on pride ( $\gamma = .66$ ,  $p < .01$ ). Model 2 of Table 5 shows that pride from the previous negotiation had a negative effect on the objective outcome of the next negotiation ( $\gamma = -.49$ ,  $p < .05$ ). The odds ratio indicated that a one-unit increase in pride reduced the odds of obtaining a discount in the following negotiation by a factor of .61, reducing the likelihood of a discount from 55% to 43%. To test the mediating role of pride (Hypothesis 3), we assessed the significance of the indirect effect of subjective value through pride using RMediation. The results indicated that the indirect effect of subjective value through pride was significant because the CI (95% CI

[-.66, -.02]) did not contain zero. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was supported; pride from the previous negotiation mediated the effect of subjective value on objective outcome in the next negotiation. Unlike Study 1, there was not a significant interaction between gender and pride, and no significant difference between the indirect effects through pride for men versus women.

## Discussion

Study 2 replicated the results of Study 1 and extended them into a field setting, in which participants negotiated as a central part of their job duties. Failure to perform adequately in these negotiations represented a threat to their continued employment, so there was ample incentive for the participants to do well.

In addition, Hypothesis 3, regarding the mediating role of pride, received stronger support in Study 2 than in Study 1. Whereas in Study 1 pride mediated the effect of subjective value on subsequent objective outcomes only for men, in Study 2 the mediating role of pride did not differ between men and women. As discussed previously, studies have found that women are less likely than men to experience pride (Kitayama et al., 2006; Stipek & Gralinski, 1991), whereas our results suggest that this gender difference is more pronounced in the lab than in the field. Evidently, pride did not play a significant role for women in the context of a simulated negotiation (Study 1), whereas in a real-world negotiation (Study 2) pride was salient for both men and women. It is also worth noting that previous studies finding gender differences in the experience of pride (Kitayama et al., 2006; Stipek & Gralinski, 1991) were conducted entirely with student populations, whereas our Study 2 involved a sample of nonstudent professionals.

## General Discussion

Across two studies, one in the lab and the other in the field, we provide one of the first empirical investigations into sequential negotiations, where people engage in more than one negotiation within a short period of time with different counterparts. In this context, we find a negative association between subjective value from one negotiation and objective outcomes from the next. Our

Table 6  
 Study 2 Multilevel Regressions Predicting Anger and Pride

Variable	Model 1: Anger		Model 2: Pride	
	$\gamma$	SE	$\gamma$	SE
Intercept ( $\gamma_{00}$ )	2.67**	.55	2.34**	.48
Level 1				
Objective outcome ( $\gamma_{10}$ )	-.76*	.28	1.29**	.30
Subjective value ( $\gamma_{20}$ )	-.33*	.13	.66**	.11
Level 3				
Gender ( $\gamma_{01}$ )	-.41	.28	.36	.59
$\sigma^2$	.57		.51	
Level 1 pseudo- $R^2$	.62		.71	
Level 3 pseudo- $R^2$	.09		.05	

Note. Level 2 (days) does not contain any predictors but is included to reflect the nesting of the negotiations within days.  $N_{L1} = 308$ .  $N_{L2} = 107$ .  $N_{L3} = 11$ . Outcome coded as 1 if a discount was negotiated and 0 if not. Gender coded as 1 for male and 0 for female.  $\gamma$  = unstandardized coefficient obtained from hierarchical linear modeling (HLM).

\*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ .

findings contrast with previous results obtained from repeated negotiations with the same counterpart, where there is a positive association between subjective value from one negotiation and objective outcomes from the next.

Our studies also shed light on the psychological mechanisms underlying the negative effect of subjective value on subsequent objective outcomes. Based on appraisal theory, we hypothesized that both anger and pride would spill over from one negotiation to the next. However, our results showed that pride was the primary mediator of the observed effect. These results are consistent with the explanation that positive subjective value leads to a kind of overconfidence or hubris, which in turn hinders performance in a second negotiation with a different counterpart.

Why was anger not found to be a mediator? One reason could be that anger tends to be a relatively short-lived feeling directed at a specific target (Ekman, 1999; Izard, 2009), so perhaps it did not last long or generalize as readily to a new counterpart in a subsequent negotiation. By contrast, pride is a self-focused emotion (Butt & Choi, 2006; Weiner, 1985) and therefore it may have persisted longer and carried over more naturally to a new situation. It is also possible that the experience of anger and associated efforts to regulate it resulted in depletion of cognitive resources (Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), which might have hampered performance in a subsequent negotiation. This effect would run in the opposite direction, counteracting our predicted effect.

It would also be worthwhile to explore whether certain types of negotiators are more or less prone to the effects we have demonstrated. Our findings suggest that women are less susceptible to negative effects of pride, and there may be other individual differences that have a mitigating or exacerbating effect. For example, prior research suggests that emotional intelligence plays an important role in negotiation (Foo, Elfenbein, Tan, & Aik, 2004; Mueller & Curhan, 2006), so perhaps the related construct of emotional stability (Hills & Argyle, 2001; Vittersø, 2001) might prevent emotions from leaking into subsequent negotiations. Conversely, a tendency toward competitiveness might exacerbate spillover effects, as was found in studies involving behavioral decision games (Sheldon, 1999). Negotiation expertise may also be an important factor. On the one hand, experience in negotiation improves accuracy in judgments about the counterpart (Thompson, 1990), which may increase one's sensitivity to the presence of a new counterpart. On the other hand, negotiation experts tend to fall victim to the same cognitive biases as novice negotiators (Neale & Northcraft, 1986; Northcraft & Neale, 1987). The negotiators in our field study were not novices, and yet they showed the predicted effects, so there is no guarantee that expertise alone would buffer someone from the negative effects of pride on a subsequent negotiation with a new counterpart.

As is often the case, there were limitations to the two studies reported here. However, by pairing two methodological designs, some of these concerns were at least partially addressed. For example, Study 1 is limited because it involved a simulated negotiation with relatively low stakes, whereas Study 2 used real-world negotiations with high stakes business outcomes. Likewise, Study 2 suffered from a dichotomous win/lose outcome measure and a small sample size (i.e., a small number of employees), whereas Study 1 found similar relationships with a continuous outcome measure and a larger sample. When the two studies are considered

together, the corresponding results make for stronger conclusions. It is also worth noting that the sample size concerns for Study 2 might be more apparent than real. While the number of individuals examined was low, the number of negotiations (our actual unit of analysis) was quite large ( $n = 308$ ). Moreover, the proportion of within-negotiator variance in subjective value at Level 1 (i.e., the bargaining session) was 50% in Study 2, suggesting that it was reasonable to use the bargaining session as the unit of analysis.

Concerning our measures, the use of single-item measures of emotions in Study 2 is a limitation, although it is not without precedent in prior research (e.g., Conroy, Becker, & Menges, 2017; Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2005). Anger and pride are distinctive emotions that people are aware of within themselves and able to report accurately (Barrett, Gross, Christensen, & Benvenuto, 2001). In addition, because of external constraints, we had to use an anger measure in Study 2 that may have tapped a weaker form of anger compared with Study 1 (Shaver et al., 1987). Nonetheless, the findings for anger and pride were consistent between the two studies. Another limitation was the fact that our measure of pride did not distinguish between hubristic and authentic pride (Tracy & Robins, 2007). It is possible that the females in Study 1 experienced more authentic than hubristic pride and therefore did not experience the same level of overconfidence. Future studies should investigate the differential effects of these two facets of pride by using more nuanced, multiitem measures or by recording and coding expressions and behaviors in subsequent negotiations.

Our findings have important implications for the practice of negotiating in organizations. As we discussed previously, it is not uncommon for certain classes of employees to spend much of their time negotiating (e.g., buyers, brokers), and many of those negotiations take place sequentially with different counterparts in each negotiation. For example, purchasing agents are often required to source products or services from a series of different suppliers whom they do not know. Although we predicted that emotional spillover across sequential negotiations could have benefits as well as drawbacks, stemming from anger and pride respectively, our findings only supported the drawbacks of pride. Therefore, negotiators should be wary of allowing any feelings to carry forward from one sequential negotiation to the next. At an individual level, negotiators who catch themselves feeling prideful would be wise to foster a more humble, learning mindset (Dweck, 2006) by asking themselves what they might do differently in a subsequent negotiation. Those who feel they have done particularly well in a previous negotiation may also benefit from letting some time elapse before starting another negotiation with a different counterpart.<sup>6</sup> Correspondingly, at an organizational level, firms would be well-advised to allow their employees some flexibility in how they schedule their negotiations, so that employees can space out negotiations when feeling particularly prideful.

In the realm of high-level, high-stakes negotiations, our findings may have even broader implications. In his book, *The Icarus Syndrome: A History of American Hubris*, Peter Beinart (2010) argued that three major blunders in U.S. foreign policy—Wood-

<sup>6</sup> In support of the idea that time mitigates the negative effects of pride, we note that in Study 2, the effects of pride from one day to the next were not significant.

row Wilson's belief that reason could govern in World War I, Lyndon Johnson's toughness in the Vietnam War, and George W. Bush's U.S.-led Invasion of Iraq—resulted in large measure from overconfidence in Washington, buoyed by preceding periods of relative success. Our current empirical findings are consistent with the assertion that hubristic pride can indeed be a liability in diplomacy and foreign affairs and, by extension, to executives who negotiate on behalf of their organizations.

Our research is part of a growing number of studies investigating negotiations that occur over time. Although much can be learned from studying individual, one-shot bargaining sessions, it is also important to consider how one negotiation can affect subsequent transactions. We hope that our study inspires new research on this important topic, and underscores the importance of differentiating between situations where counterparts change versus remain the same.

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### Correction to Bamberger et al. (2017)

In the article “Does College Alcohol Consumption Impact Employment Upon Graduation? Findings From a Prospective Study,” by Peter A. Bamberger, Jaclyn Koopmann, Mo Wang, Mary Larimer, Inbal Nahum-Shani, Irene Geisner, and Samuel B. Bacharach (*Journal of Applied Psychology*, Advance online publication. August 24, 2017. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/apl0000244>), the authors incorrectly used the term “probability” instead of the term “odds” when relating to the impact of drinking in college on post-graduation employment. The abstract should note “**a roughly 10% reduction in the odds . . .**”, and in the 2nd paragraph of the Discussion section, (a) “a roughly 10% lower probability” should be “**a roughly 10% lower odds**”, and (b) “their probability of full-time employment upon graduation is roughly 6% lower than . . .” should be “**their odds of full-time employment upon graduation is roughly 6% lower than . . .**” All versions of this article have been corrected.

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