CHAPTER

43 Parallel and Divergent Predictors of Objective and Subjective Value in Negotiation

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Abstract

The negotiation field has been dominated by a focus on *objective value* (or economic outcomes) with relatively less attention paid to *subjective value* (or social psychological outcomes). This chapter proposes a framework that highlights the duality of negotiation outcomes by identifying predictors of both objective and subjective value. Whereas some predictors tend to have parallel effects, benefiting objective and subjective value in tandem, other predictors tend to have divergent effects, benefiting objective value while simultaneously undermining subjective value, or vice versa. We further distinguish between predictors typically outside of the negotiator's control, such as personality traits and individual differences, versus predictors typically within the negotiator's control, such as behaviors and strategies. We offer 12 examples of predictors that illustrate this new framework, with the aim of advising individuals on how best to manage both objective and subjective value, thereby achieving peak performance in negotiations.

Keywords: Negotiation, subjective value, objective value, individual differences, negotiator behaviors, negotiator strategies

Conventional wisdom and decades of research in American behavioral science have tended to portray negotiation as a process of joint decision-making over the terms of exchange for scarce resources (Neale & Bazerman, 1985; Pruitt, 1983; Wall, 1985; Young, 1991). From this perspective, it is understandable that the vast majority of studies on negotiation have focused on how to achieve tangible, objective outcomes, whereas only a small fraction of studies have included subjective measures of performance, such as attitudes and perceptions (Bendersky & McGinn, 2010; Mestdagh & Buelens, 2003). Yet, in the spirit of positive organizational scholarship (POS) (e.g., Cameron, Dutton, & Quinn, 2003; Dutton & Glynn, 2008), we argue that this imbalance in the field may lead negotiators astray, because the same prescriptions that are intended to benefit objective outcomes sometimes have unintended negative consequences for social psychological outcomes. In this chapter, we propose a new framework and use it to identify specific predictors of objective and subjective outcomes in negotiation.

Underlying our framework is a distinction between two kinds of outcomes in negotiation. *Economic outcomes* are the terms of the deal (or lack thereof), whereas *social psychological outcomes* are the attitudes and perceptions of the negotiators (Thompson, 1990). Economic outcomes refer to goods and services and can be said to have an *objective value* (OV), or worth defined by a market or by a negotiator's ex ante preferences. Social psychological outcomes, such as satisfaction or liking, can be said to have a *subjective value* (SV) as evaluated by a negotiator ex post (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006). The construct of SV emerged from a series of studies by Curhan et al. (2006), who defined SV as the "social, perceptual, and emotional consequences

of a negotiation" (p. 494), comprising the negotiator's feelings about the instrumental outcome, feelings about him- or herself, feelings about the process, and feelings about the relationship.[2]

Given that SV is less tangible or concrete relative to OV, many behavioral scientists who study negotiation and professionals in business and law construe negotiation as being primarily about OV and tend to "write off" SV as amounting to a fleeting perception that is difficult to measure reliably and is subject to heuristics and biases. This emphasis on OV is also consistent with a broader tendency in traditional organization studies to attend to economic outcomes more so than positive states and processes (Cameron et al., 2003). For instance, Walsh, Margolis, and Weber (2003) coded all articles published by the Academy of Management from 1958 to 2001 and found a diminishing focus on social outcomes and a rising focus over time on economic outcomes. By contrast, the POS movement has been described as a potential corrective to this predominant concern with economic and financial considerations (Dutton & Glynn, 2008). Similarly, our framework is intended as a corrective to an overemphasis on OV—drawing upon a growing literature that has demonstrated a number of important benefits associated with fostering SV in negotiation.

Subjective value in negotiation is important for at least four reasons. First, negotiators frequently care more about subjective outcomes, such as feeling positive, being respected, or having a favorable relationship, than about the substance of an agreement (Blount & Larrick, 2000; Gelfand, Major, Raver, Nishii, & O'Brien, 2006; Tyler & Blader, 2003). In other words, SV may in some cases represent a good unto itself, or even the primary interest of a negotiating party (Lax & Sebenius, 1986).

Second, those who build solid relationships with their counterparts or who develop positive reputations are more likely to be sought after as a partner or a counterpart in future exchanges (Tenbrunsel, Wade-Benzoni, Moag, & Bazerman, 1999; Tinsley, O'Connor, & Sullivan, 2002). For example, in two longitudinal studies, individuals who reported high SV immediately following a negotiation subsequently reported greater intent to remain in professional contact, greater desire to work on the same team, and greater willingness to negotiate again with their counterpart, whereas OV from the initial negotiation showed none of these predictive effects (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Eisenkraft, 2010; Curhan et al., 2006). Having more parties with whom to negotiate increases one's bargaining power in any single negotiation to the extent that it increases one's best alternative to a negotiated agreement.

Third, related to the previous point, SV resulting from one negotiation may "pay off" in terms of OV, particularly in the context of long-term interactions (Croson & Glick, 2001; Drolet & Morris, 2000; Fortgang, Lax, & Sebenius, 2003; Mannix, Tinsley, & Bazerman, 1995). In one of the few research studies in which negotiation performance has been examined longitudinally, individuals achieved greater individual and joint OV in a second negotiation if they experienced greater SV in an initial negotiation with the same counterpart, even after controlling for initial OV (Curhan et al., 2010).

Finally, SV is associated with commitment to upholding a deal. To the extent that negotiation outcomes are not self-enforcing, SV can serve as an "insurance policy," increasing the chances that the parties will follow through on their obligations set forth in the terms of the agreement. Counter to the conventional wisdom that SV is fleeting or labile, longitudinal research has demonstrated that SV can be remarkably robust over time—perhaps even more robust than OV. For example, Curhan, Elfenbein, and Kilduff (2009) examined OV and SV resulting from MBA students' job offer negotiations and demonstrated a remarkably strong correlation between these predictors and the students' subsequent job attitudes and turnover intentions an entire year later. Subjective value from these high-stakes, real-world employment negotiations predicted greater subsequent compensation satisfaction and job satisfaction, as well as lower subsequent turnover intention (i.e., intent to leave the job). In contrast, negotiators' OV had no apparent long-term effects on these important outcomes (see also Ferguson, Moye, & Friedman, 2008; Robinson & Morrison, 2000; Robinson & Rousseau, 1994).

Given the new wealth of evidence for the importance of SV as an outcome variable in negotiation, the question naturally arises, where does SV come from? In this chapter, we focus on specific predictors of SV, organized in a new theoretical framework, as depicted in Figure 43.1. By no means do we consider this to be a complete list of relevant predictors. Our purpose is illustrative rather than exhaustive, and several of our predictors were selected due to their close associations with the core mechanisms discussed in the POS literature. For example, we highlight self-efficacy and positive affect, which relate to the POS mechanisms of positive meaning making and positive emoting, respectively (Dutton & Glynn, 2008).



Fig. 43.1 A theoretical framework populated with example predictors of objective and subjective value.

Our aim is to build a new framework for researchers and practitioners alike that highlights the duality of negotiation outcomes, incorporating not only OV, but also the frequently ignored elements of SV.

In addition to the aforementioned distinction between OV and SV, our framework draws two distinctions among potential predictors of those outcomes. The first distinction is between parallel and divergent predictors. We use the term *parallel predictors* to refer to predictors with uniform effects on both OV and SV. These predictors have relatively clear implications in that their effects tend to be either generally beneficial or generally detrimental for a negotiator. We use the term *divergent predictors* to refer to predictors with bidirectional effects, benefiting OV while undermining SV, or vice versa. By definition, divergent predictors are beneficial in some respects but detrimental in others, which may make them useful under certain circumstances, depending on the negotiator's relative prioritization of OV and SV. Judgments regarding the relative weightings of OV and SV may depend on features of the situation, such as the expectation of a future relationship.

We draw a further distinction in our framework between predictors that tend to be outside the control of an individual negotiator, such as personality or gender, versus predictors that could be under a negotiator's control and could, thereby, enter explicitly into a negotiator's tactical decision-making. In the final section of this paper, we include advice for negotiators on how to manage the tension between fostering OV and fostering SV, as well as ways in which one might deal with predictors that are within or beyond the negotiator's control.

Predictors Outside of the Negotiator's Control

Predictors outside of the negotiator's control tend to involve individual differences, such as personality or gender. In this respect, the findings discussed here contribute to an ongoing debate regarding the extent to which individual differences explain variance in negotiation outcomes (Barry & Friedman, 1998; Lewicki, Litterer, Minton, & Saunders, 1994; Terhune, 1970; Thompson, 1990). Although an individual negotiator may have limited or no ability to transform his or her stable characteristics (and even less ability to influence a counterpart's traits), an understanding of how particular individual differences are likely to influence one's negotiation performance is itself an advantage to the negotiator. Research on systematic individual differences helps one understand and even predict behavior.

More specifically, such knowledge can help negotiators diagnose their own negotiation style, predict the behaviors of their counterparts, or choose who to employ as negotiation advocates on their behalf. Therefore, we start with an overview of both parallel and divergent predictors of SV and OV that tend to be outside of the negotiator's control.

Parallel Predictors Outside of the Negotiator's Control

To begin, we consider predictors outside of the negotiator's control that have a parallel or uniform effect on OV and SV. For these predictors, the negotiator need not reconcile how to balance trade-offs between OV and SV.

DISPOSITIONAL AFFECT

Studies involving dispositional positive affect have emerged from a literature increasingly concerned with the effects of trait and state affect in negotiation (Barry, Fulmer, & Van Kleef, 2004; Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Forgas, 1998). With regard to SV, it is not surprising that dispositional positive affect—i.e., the extent to which people have extraverted personalities or a stable tendency to feel enthusiastic (Watson & Clark, 1984)—would tend to correlate with more positive feelings at the end of a negotiation. Less obvious is the fact that positive mood has been found to predict joint OV by reducing reliance on contentious or competitive tactics (Carnevale & Isen, 1986). Consistent with these findings, Elfenbein, Curhan, Eisenkraft, Shirako, and Baccaro (2008) demonstrated empirically that dispositional positive affect is a robust predictor of both one's own OV ($r = 0.17$, $p < 0.05$) and one's own SV ($r = 0.25$, $p < 0.01$). As such, dispositional positive affect tends to be a beneficial trait for individuals to have under most circumstances in a negotiation.

ASSOCIATIONS WITH NEGOTIATION

Even more promising than positive affect in general is the positivity of one's associations, attitudes, and beliefs about negotiation per se. For example, Sullivan, O'Connor, and Burris (2006) identified a form of self-efficacy specifically related to negotiation. Integrative self-efficacy refers to one's confidence in enlarging the pie and fostering rapport. Elfenbein et al. (2008) found that integrative self-efficacy results in a parallel effect, increasing one's own OV and SV.[3] Another parallel effect can be found among those who believe negotiation ability is a skill that can be learned, as opposed to a fixed trait that is set at birth (Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007). Individuals who view negotiation skills as malleable in this respect achieve greater OV for themselves and tend to feel better about their relationships with their counterparts (Elfenbein et al., 2008). In sum, many empirical findings suggest that both OV and SV are benefited by positive attitudes concerning one's ability to enlarge the pie, one's ability to establish rapport, and one's ability to improve as a negotiator.[4]

GENDER

Gender is another individual difference measure related to negotiation that has been studied for many years. As Kray and Thompson (2005) describe, people have lay theories about what it takes to succeed in negotiations, and these perceptions generally place females at a disadvantage. Recent meta-analyses and literature reviews also have suggested that men tend to achieve higher individual OV in negotiations than do women, and this tendency emerges across a range of study designs, including archival analyses, collective bargaining tasks, and coalition games (Kray & Thompson, 2005; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; Walters, Stuhlmacher, & Meyer, 1998). Although there has been less research on integrative than distributive negotiations, male–male dyads also tend to create more joint OV than female–female dyads (Kray & Thompson, 2005; Miles & LaSalle, 2004; Neu, Graham, & Gilly, 1988). One explanation for men achieving higher individual and joint OV is that men tend to set higher goals in their negotiations (Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001; Stevens, Bavetta, & Gist, 1993), and high goals have been associated with improved OV (Bazerman, Magliozzi, & Neale, 1985; Huber & Neale, 1987; Neale & Bazerman, 1985; Stevens et al., 1993). Men also tend to report lower apprehension prior to negotiating (Babcock, Gelfand, Small, & Stayn, 2006), greater confidence while negotiating (Watson, 1994), and higher SV post-negotiation (Watson, 1994; Watson & Hoffman, 1996). These parallel effects of gender on OV and SV may be explained by differential treatment of men and women. Bowles, Babcock, and Lai (2007) found that male evaluators penalized women more than men for attempting to negotiate for higher compensation. As such, the effects of gender on OV and SV may be reinforced by gender stereotypes. It should be noted, however, that particular situational characteristics can mitigate some of these gender differences.[5]

Divergent Predictors Outside of the Negotiator's Control

In contrast to the parallel predictors, the examples presented in this section tend to drive OV and SV in opposite directions. We offer one example of a trait that benefits OV yet undermines SV followed by two examples of traits that benefit SV yet undermine OV.

MAXIMIZING VERSUS SATISFICING

Building on a perspective first articulated by Herbert Simon (1955), Schwartz and colleagues (2002) proposed a distinction between two kinds of decision-makers in the face of choices involving many alternatives. Maximizers seek the "best outcome" and feel pressure to examine as many alternatives as possible, whereas "satisficers" seek an outcome that is "good enough" and then stop searching. Maximizing tendencies have been associated with improved objective outcomes at the expense of subjective outcomes. Specifically, Iyengar, Wells, and Schwartz (2006) found that students who scored high on a personality scale designed to measure maximizing tendencies secured 20% higher starting salaries compared to students with low maximizing tendencies. At the same time, these maximizers were less satisfied with the jobs that they secured and also experienced more negative feelings throughout the job search process, including stress, fatigue, anxiety, and worry. Iyengar et al. (2006) argue that, in seeking out an undefined "best" outcome, maximizers are more susceptible to experiencing regret associated with unrealistically high expectations.

EXTREME RELATIONAL ORIENTATION

An extreme concern or unhealthy anxiety over interpersonal relationships in negotiation can result in lower individual and joint OV. This phenomenon dates back to the classic negotiation study by Fry, Firestone, and Williams (1983) in which dating couples—particularly those couples who were defensive or possessive about their relationships (Rubin, 1970)—achieved lower joint OV compared to strangers. More recently, Gelfand et al. (2006) developed a theoretical model involving the broader concept of "relational self-construal," which refers to a cognitive representation of the self as fundamentally connected to other individuals. One prediction of this model is that dyads in which both parties have high relational self-construal accessibility[6] will experience a "relational satisficing" dynamic, resulting in higher SV but lower individual and joint OV (Gelfand et al., 2006). Consistent with this prediction, Curhan, Neale, Ross, and Rosencranz-Engelmann (2008) empirically demonstrated that dyads negotiating within highly relational contexts[7] had greater SV in that they trusted and liked their counterparts more and believed their counterparts liked them more. However, these same dyads reached outcomes of lower joint OV. Similarly, within a negotiation context, Amanatullah, Morris, and Curhan (2008) examined a construct called "unmitigated communion," or a dispositional orientation marked by anxiety about social relationships with others coupled with low concern for oneself (Fritz & Helgeson, 1998). They found that unmitigated communion led negotiators to make concessions in order to avoid straining relationships, which resulted in lower individual OV. Furthermore, high unmitigated communion on both sides of a negotiation resulted in greater SV in the form of relational satisfaction but lower joint OV (Amanatullah et al., 2008). In summary, the pattern across all of these studies is that individual and joint OV is forfeited in deference to relational concerns when both members of a dyad show extreme concern for the other.

EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

The construct of emotional intelligence captures a range of abilities that includes perceiving emotion, facilitating thought with emotion, understanding emotion, and regulating emotion (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2000)—all factors that relate to the management of SV in negotiation (Fulmer & Barry, 2004). Indeed, those who are high on emotional intelligence tend to experience greater SV themselves and tend to induce greater SV in their counterparts (Der Foo, Elfenbein, Tan, & Aik, 2004; Mueller & Curhan, 2006). However, those who are high in emotional intelligence also tend to have lower individual OV (Der Foo et al., 2004) and counterparts with higher OV (Mueller & Curhan, 2006) than those who are low in emotional intelligence. Der Foo et al. (2004) argue that perhaps emotionally intelligent negotiators show too much sympathy and are more trusting relative to low emotional intelligence negotiators and thus may be more conciliatory.

In summary, this section has provided examples of predictors over which negotiators may not have extensive control, yet these predictors influence OV and SV. Dispositional positive affect, positive

attitudes about negotiation, and gender serve as examples of a broad class of predictors that tend to have parallel or uniform influences on both OV and SV. Perhaps of greater concern to both researchers and practitioners, however, are those predictors that create a tension between OV and SV, such as maximizing tendencies, relational self-construal, and emotional intelligence. The divergent consequences of these predictors for OV and SV mean that the negotiator must attempt to weigh or calculate which outcomes are of greatest importance in any particular negotiation.

Predictors Within the Negotiator's Control

Although most negotiators have limited ability to alter the predictors discussed above, many situational characteristics or behavioral strategies tend to be within the control of the negotiator. Some of these strategies can enhance both OV and SV, whereas others result in a tension between the two kinds of outcomes.

Parallel Predictors Within the Negotiator's Control

Once again, we begin with a consideration of predictors within the negotiator's control that do not require a tradeoff between OV and SV. Specifically, choosing a rich medium of communication, building rapport, and asking questions are valuable strategies for enhancing OV and SV under a broad range of circumstances.

MEDIA RICHNESS

Media richness refers to the degree of information, such as rapid feedback or personal presence, that can be conveyed through a particular communication medium (Poole, Shannon, & DeSanctis, 1992). Although there has been a great deal of mixed evidence regarding how face-to-face negotiations compare to computer mediated, video-conferencing, or telephone negotiations, in general, media richness benefits both OV and SV—which is consistent with the notion so central to the POS literature that high-quality connections between individuals are vital for positive organizational dynamics (Dutton & Glynn, 2008).[8] Stuhlmacher and Citera (2005) conducted a meta-analysis reviewing studies that compared various mediums and concluded that face-to-face negotiations are less hostile and result in higher individual profit than other communication media. McGinn and Croson (2004) also argue that visual access increases social awareness and lends itself to more cooperation, coordination, truth telling, and rapport building. Face-to-face negotiators tend to experience greater rapport, trust, and cooperation (Drolet & Morris, 2000) and complete negotiations in less time, with a greater desire for future interaction (Purdy, Nye, & Balakrishnan, 2000). By contrast, online negotiators have lower SV, are less confident in their outcomes, and express lower levels of trust both before and after the negotiation (Naquin & Paulson, 2003). Negotiators communicating via less rich media may also be less accurate in judging counterpart interests, resulting in lower individual and joint OV (Arunachalam & Dilla, 1995). Although there are some exceptions, including situations that are emotionally charged (Carnevale, Pruitt, & Seilheimer, 1981; Carnevale & Isen, 1986) or situations in which negotiators need time to reflect (Pesendorfer & Koeszegi, 2006), greater media richness generally benefits both OV and SV.

RAPPORT BUILDING

Using humor and developing rapport uniformly benefit both OV and SV and are also within the negotiator's control. Specifically, humor has been found to "ease" the pain when trying to influence or make final demands in a negotiation. Across three different final offer levels, O'Quin and Aronoff (1981) found that negotiators made larger concessions, evaluated the task more positively, and reported marginally less tension when the final offer was requested in a humorous way. A related strategy is to establish rapport either prior to or during the negotiation. Moore, Kurtzberg, Thompson, and Morris (1999) found that sharing personal information and in-group affiliation reduced the rate of impasse with electronically mediated negotiations. Similarly, Morris, Nadler, Kurtzberg, and Thompson (2002) found that a brief telephone conversation prior to a negotiation conducted over e-mail resulted in greater rapport and higher rates of agreement.[9] This finding is particularly astonishing, given that the phone call had such effects after a week of e-mail negotiating, suggesting that the benefits of rapport are by no means fleeting.

ASKING QUESTIONS

Tactics such as asking questions have also been found to be advantageous. Fairfield and Allred (2007) found that the more positive regard negotiators have for each other the more that they ask questions, which in turn, produces better understandings of the other side's interests and higher joint OV. This is consistent with Thompson's (1991) findings

that negotiators achieved higher joint OV after asking more questions of the counterpart. In conflict situations, another advantage of asking questions is that it signals an interest in the other side's view, which enhances relationships and counterpart SV (Carnegie, 1963; Chen, Minson, & Tormala, 2010); furthermore, the person asking the questions becomes more open to the idea of having a conversation and tends to view the counterpart more positively (Chen et al., 2010). As such, asking questions can have benefits for both parties involved.

Divergent Predictors Within the Negotiator's Control

Despite being within the negotiator's control, other predictors are likely to represent a dilemma for the negotiator because they introduce a tradeoff between OV and SV. The use of these predictors requires more careful consideration, given that strategies aimed at achieving higher OV may undermine SV, and vice versa. In this section, we review three predictors that tend to enhance OV at the expense of SV.

NUMBER OF ISSUES

One of the main defining features of a negotiation is the number of issues under consideration (Raiffa, 1982). The prescriptive advice often provided is that negotiators should try to include as many issues as possible in any given deal-making process and strive to resolve those issues simultaneously rather than sequentially (Erickson, Holmes, Frey, Walker, & Thibaut, 1974; Froman & Cohen, 1970; Kelley, 1966; Pruitt, 1981; Yukl, Malone, Hayslip, & Pamin, 1976). More issues allow for more creative problem solving via *logrolling*—or trading off issues based on differences in relative priorities (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991; Froman & Cohen, 1970; Lewicki, Saunders, & Minton, 1997; Pruitt, 1983; Raiffa, 1982; Thompson, 2001)—thereby resulting in higher joint OV. However, more recent research has found that the number of issues in any given negotiation is associated with lower levels of SV due to counterfactual thought processes (Naquin, 2003). Although Naquin (2003) found that the participants negotiating over more issues did indeed achieve higher joint OV, which is consistent with the prescriptive advice to include more issues, this tactic simultaneously undermined SV. The negotiator is caught between maximizing payoffs yet feeling worse about the outcome. This phenomenon is consistent with the findings discussed above regarding maximizers versus satisficers, in which maximizers had higher OV yet lower SV. Too many issues in a negotiation may be analogous to facing too many decision alternatives and, therefore, may undermine the negotiator's SV, particularly if the negotiator is a maximizer. Thus, the negotiator is presented with a dilemma, in which she or he can either try to incorporate more issues in the negotiation, prioritizing OV, or incorporate fewer issues in the negotiation, prioritizing SV.

ASPIRATIONS

Another common negotiation strategy with a wealth of empirical support is to focus on aspiration values to achieve higher OV (Huber & Neale, 1986, 1987; Northcraft, Neale, & Earley, 1994; Thompson, 2001). However, Galinsky, Mussweiler, and Medvec (2002) found that negotiators who focus on their ideal outcomes or aspiration values cannot resolve the dissonance experienced at the end of the negotiation and, subsequently, have lower SV. The negotiators in their study who focused on their aspiration values (or goals) obtained higher individual OV compared to those who focused on their reservation prices (or backup plans), as expected, yet they had lower SV. Similarly, Thompson (1995) found that negotiators have lower SV when they have high aspirations relative to when they have low aspirations, even when reservation prices and individual OV are identical. As Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman (1989) argue, satisfaction is often a function of perceived relative gain or comparison to others, rather than absolute gain (see also Novemsky & Schweitzer, 2004).

STRATEGIC DISPLAY OF ANGER

Finally, a burgeoning literature on emotion in negotiation, and the strategic display of anger, in particular, has received a great deal of attention. Intuition and initial evidence suggested that negative emotion, such as anger, would bring about suboptimal behaviors (Barry & Oliver, 1996) and would be associated with a range of negative consequences such that it should be avoided (Ury, 1991). Indeed, the strategic display of anger has negative repercussions for SV. Expression of anger may violate certain justice principles (Van Kleef & Côté, 2007); damage reputations (Clark, Pataki, & Carver, 1996); breed mutual anger, hostility, and aggression (Baron, Neuman, & Geddes, 1999; Kennedy, Homant, & Homant, 2004); and lead to a desire to get even (Bies & Tripp, 2001; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). More broadly, negotiators with angry counterparts have been found to experience more anger themselves, have reduced SV, and express less

willingness to engage in future negotiations (Friedman et al., 2004; Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004b). However, the expression of anger has also been found to benefit OV. The display of anger can convey the magnitude or significance of an issue and, subsequently, may influence or change behavior. Negotiators generally make lower demands and concede more when their counterparts display anger compared to happiness[10] (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a; Van Kleef et al., 2004b), and angry negotiators are able to claim more value when their counterparts have few alternatives (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006). Furthermore, the effects of anger may carry over across negotiations, in which negotiators may demand less when they encounter a counterpart who expressed anger in a previous negotiation (Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2008). As such, the strategic display of anger has a divergent effect on OV and SV, where the expression of anger is associated with benefits for OV but at the expense of SV.

In this section, we have reviewed predictors that are within the control of the negotiator, or examples of situational characteristics and behavioral strategies that negotiators can use to their advantage. Three of these examples benefit both OV and SV, whereas three other examples benefit OV yet tend to be detrimental for SV. With these latter examples, negotiators may need to prioritize either OV or SV or otherwise try to overcome the tension between the two. We discuss this at greater length below.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have presented a new framework and 12 illustrative predictors of two kinds of outcomes in negotiation—OV and SV. Whereas some predictors have parallel effects on OV and SV, other predictors have divergent effects, driving the two kinds of outcomes in opposite directions.

One prescriptive implication of our proposed framework is that negotiators should account for the fact that some strategies will help both OV and SV, whereas others may help one while hindering the other. In the latter case, a negotiator needs to gauge which types of ends are most important. Moreover, some predictors tend to be outside of the negotiator's control while others tend to be within the negotiator's control. By managing the predictors within the negotiator's control and recognizing the predictors outside of one's control, one can maximize the chances of achieving peak performance.

Although we advise that negotiators deliberately consider which outcomes are most important in any particular negotiation, such decisions are unlikely to be straightforward. This mental accounting may be biased toward an overvaluation of short-term objective outcomes. However, a prioritization of SV might serve the negotiator better in the long-term. Research from the procedural justice domain suggests that people tend to emphasize instrumental concerns when they make choices, yet focus on procedural justice when asked about experiences already encountered. Tyler and Blader (2004) suggest that this tendency may have important implications and extensions to the negotiation context, where economic outcomes may be valued prior to and during the negotiation but subjective criteria may be valued more heavily retrospectively. As such, negotiators could be caught in a bind as preferences or the relative weighting of OV and SV shift over time. One of our goals in presenting our proposed framework is to emphasize the importance of SV, which may help negotiators in overcoming this bias if both OV and SV are considered in advance as important outcomes.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, consciously weighing the relative importance of OV and SV represents one method of handling divergent predictors (e.g., Savage, Blair, & Sorenson, 1999). Another method involves reappraising the situation so as to eliminate the bind altogether. For example, Galinsky et al. (2002) found that negotiators' whose satisfaction had been undermined by their own high aspiration values could increase their satisfaction after the negotiation by shifting their focus from their aspiration prices (or goals) to their reservation prices (or backup plans). Still another strategy may be to compensate for any harm done to SV. For example, Van Kleef and De Dreu (2008) found that offering an apology can offset some of the negative effects of displaying anger on SV.

Future Directions

As mentioned earlier, the examples offered here are intended to be illustrative of the kinds of predictors that might be researched in the future. Since less than 20% of negotiation studies focus on subjective outcomes (Mestdagh & Buelens, 2003), there is a great deal still to be learned. We hope that this chapter will provide a framework for future research on predictors of SV. For example, one area for future research is in the domain of self-enhancing biases, which may lead negotiators to overestimate their own performance (Kramer et al., 1993), contributing to

greater SV, yet undermine their ability to reach agreements due to unrealistic expectations. Another domain for future research is the tenet of negotiation theory that prescribes the use of objective criteria, or principles of legitimacy to strengthen one's arguments in a negotiation (Fisher et al., 1991). This practice may potentially enhance OV, but the use of rights-based arguments may also undermine relationships because conflicting parties tend to disagree over what constitutes a fair settlement (Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997; Ury, Brett, & Goldberg, 1988).

It is our hope that the framework presented in this chapter will underscore the danger of measuring just one type of outcome in negotiation and help to motivate further research exploring the duality of negotiation outcomes. Additionally, negotiation serves as an illustrative context that highlights the broader POS perspective that positive dynamics and subjective outcomes are crucial for organizational scholars and practitioners to take into account above and beyond instrumental concerns.

Notes

1. Both authors contributed equally.
2. For the sake of parsimony, we conflate the subdimensions of SV throughout this chapter.
3. To the contrary, distributive self-efficacy, which refers to one's confidence in claiming a greater share of resources for oneself, results in a divergent effect—benefiting one's own OV at the expense of the counterpart's SV.
4. An exception to the benefits of self-efficacy in negotiation may be a negotiator who is overly positive or high in self-efficacy. These negotiators may be biased in their judgments or assessments of the negotiation. Kramer, Newton, and Pommerenke (1993) found that positive mood and motivation to maintain high self-esteem contribute to negotiator overconfidence and overly positive self-evaluations; to the extent that an impasse occurs, these negotiators may be high in SV but at the expense of not reaching an agreement.
5. Gender may have less of an effect, for example, when situations are low in ambiguity (i.e., economic structure is clear) or when women are negotiating on behalf of others (Bowles, Babcock, & McGinn, 2005). Similarly, although gender stereotypes are pervasive and powerful, how they are activated (implicitly or explicitly) and which gender-specific traits are connected to negotiator effectiveness may alter how the stereotypes influence negotiation performance (Kray, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2002; Kray et al., 2001); for instance, an explicit endorsement of stereotypes that are negative for women actually led women to outperform men as they behaved in a manner inconsistent with the stereotype (see also Curhan & Overbeck, 2008; Kray et al., 2001).
6. Many factors increase relational self-construal accessibility, including situational contexts, which contribute to temporary accessibility, and individual differences, which may foster chronic accessibility. As such, relational self-construal may be a predictor that is both within and outside of the negotiator's control.
7. Situations in which individuals hold a representation of themselves as being fundamentally interdependent.
8. Some studies have found benefits to face-to-face negotiations (Arunachalam & Dilla, 1995), whereas other studies have found benefits to computer mediated negotiations (Croson, 1999). Still others have found few differences at all (Rangaswamy & Shell, 1997). Poole, Shannon, and DeSanctis (1992) argue that all mediums have their strengths and weaknesses (e.g., some mediums are better at surfacing conflict, while others are better at providing time for reflection, etc.), and the optimal choice depends on the specifics of the negotiation.
9. These two studies suggest that rapport building may also be a strategy to overcome some of the potential drawbacks associated with online negotiations.
10. Transitions between happy and angry states also impact negotiation outcomes, where negotiators who become angry yield higher concessions and reach agreements more than negotiators displaying steady-state anger (Filipowicz, Barsade, & Melwani, 2010).

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