

- 9-10:30AM on Thursday, May 19, 2005
- Johnson Ice Rink
- <u>All</u> material from Lecture 16 (April 4) through Recitation 26 (May 12)
- · Bring your notes!
- · Print out the Unison paper and bring it.

Atomicity Concepts

Chapters 9 and 10 LFS, System R, Chocolate, Unison, Durability

LFS: Motivation

RAM is cheap, so:

- → The buffer cache will be large
- \rightarrow Reads will be "absorbed" by the buffer cache
- → Let's design a filesystem that makes writes *really* fast

LFS: On-Disk Layout ssl 23 M1 ss2 47 23 M2 mkdir("/etc", 0); fd = open("/etc/group", O_RDWR | O_CREAT); write(fd, buf, 5000); Segment Summary Data Inode Inode Map


LFS: Observations

- LFS uses checkpoints to decrease recovery time
 - Checkpoint region points to all blocks in the inode map
- · LFS outperforms SunOS FS for
 - Small writes
 - Many file creates

LFS: Coping With a Finite Disk


- Divide disk into segments of size s
 - Time to write s bytes >> rotational + seek latency
 - s << buffer cache size
- · Idea is to write whole segments at once
- Cleaner runs periodically
 - Bottom line: no one really knows the cleaning overhead


Database Terminology 6.033 System R Meaning **Definition** Terminology Do it all or not at all. Recoverable "Atomic" Do it all before or all Isolated "Consistent" after. Recoverable and N/A **Atomic** isolated. App-specified invariant is Consistent N/A preserved.





Alyssa P. Hacker's DBMS On-disk log records transactions Reference copy of all data in RAM Checkpoint: write entire database state to

the logRecovery: start from last chpkted state









System R Shadow Files Data Page 1 Page 2 File.shadow ← file.current


• FILE RESTORE: file.current ← file.shadow

System R Write-Ahead Logging

- Commit
- · Checkpoint
- · How is write-ahead logging useful?
- · "Golden Rule" of Recoverability
 - Never modify the only copy of data

System R Checkpoint and Recovery

- · Checkpoint:
 - Write checkpoint log record
 - FILE SAVE every shadow file
 - Remember log address of checkpoint record
- Recovery:
 - FILE RESTORE files to their shadowed versions
 - Determine losers, winners
 - Undo or redo as necessary



IBM IMS Database System


- · Version 1 (1968) Isolation Protocol
 - A transaction may read only data that has been written by previously committed transactions.
 - A transaction must acquire a lock for every data item that it will write.

6.033 Notes,

IBM IMS Database System Initially, x=3 and y=4 Intent: T1 assigns y=x; T2 assigns x=y I BEGIN (TI); I BEGIN (T2); 2 ACQUIRE (lock of y); 2 I temp1 \leftarrow x; I assigns y=x; T2 assigns x=y I BEGIN (TI); I BEGIN (T2); 2 ACQUIRE (lock of y); 5 temp2 \leftarrow y; 6 for \leftarrow temp2 \leftarrow y; 6 for \leftarrow temp2; 7 y \leftarrow temp1; 7 for \leftarrow y \leftarrow temp1; 8 goodMIT (T1); 8 good GOMMIT (T2); Values after this execution completes? Have we achieved isolation?

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Unison

- · Reconciles a file system on a remote host
- Optimistic vs. pessimistic concurrency control
- State-based vs. log-based concurrency control
- · Detecting changes
 - Modification time
 - inode number
 - Cryptographic fingerprint

Protecting Information

Chapter 11 and Appendices,
Slammer, DoS,
Reflections on Trusting Trust,
Why Cryptosystems Fail,
Lampsons's Hints for System Design

Slammer: Buffer Overruns argv How not to read input into your Increasing memory addresses Stack grows downward argc int main(int argc, char **argv) { char buffer[1024]; Frame pointer gets (buffer); Return address return 0; buffer[1023] This program could have read input from the network instead of the keyboard, resulting in a buffer[0] remote exploit!

Slammer: Design and Lessons

- Slammer exploited a similar buffer overrun in MS SQL Server 2000
- Very simple exploit program
 - Send identical attack packets to random IPs, as fast as possible
- · Exponential attack rate
- · Lesson to users: close unused ports
- Lesson to OS vendors: be secure by default

Internet Denial of Service

- TCP SYN flooding
 - Solution: SYN cookies: push burden onto client
- · Reflectors
 - ICMP Smurf attack
 - · Solution: ingress filtering