



## General Design Principles

*Robustness principle*

be tolerant of inputs, strict on outputs

*End-to-end argument*

the application knows best

*Open design principle*

you need all the help you can get

*Incommensurate scaling rule*

changing a parameter by a factor of ten usually requires a new design

*Design for iteration*

you won't get it right the first time

*Principle of diminishing returns*

to increase utilization requires effort that is out of proportion

*Escalating complexity principle*

adding function adds complexity that is out of proportion

*Adopt sweeping simplifications*

pair-and-compare  
separate authentication from confidentiality  
best-effort network  
stateless protocols  
each variable has only one author  
optimize just the common case  
don't overwrite, create a new version instead

*Stay back from the edge of the cliff*

and monitor how far away it is

*Beware of excessive generality*

if it is good for everything it is good for nothing (Hammer's law)



## Complexity Revisited

6.033 Lecture 26

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
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## Coping with Complexity

- Sources
- Learning from failure (and success)
- Fighting back
- Admonition

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## Too many objectives



## Not enough systematic methods

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Many objectives

+


Few methods

+

High  $d(\text{technology})/dt$

=


Very high risk



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## No hard-edged barrier—


it just gets worse...



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## Learn from failure

Pharaoh Sneferu's first try




Meidum pyramid  
*The outer layers collapsed*

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## Learn from failure

Pharaoh Sneferu's second try



Dashur (bent) pyramid  
*The plan changed midway, but interior chambers still collapsed.*

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## Learn from failure

Pharaoh Sneferu's third try



Red pyramid  
*Success*

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## Learn from failure

*Complex systems fail for complex reasons*

- Find the cause...
- Find a second cause...
- Keep looking...
- Find the mind-set.

(see Petroski, *Design Paradigms*)

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### NYC: 2,963 traffic lights

Univac, based on experience in Baltimore and Toronto with 100 lights

started: 1965  
scrapped: 1968  
spent: \$5.4M

- two years behind schedule
- changing specifications
- second-system effect:
  - new, untried sensors
  - new, untried software
  - new, untried algorithms
- incommensurate scaling at 30X

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### California Department of Motor Vehicles

Vehicle registration, driver's licenses

started: 1987  
scrapped: 1994  
spent: \$44M

- Underestimated cost by factor of 3
- Slower than 1965 system
- Governor fired the whistleblower
- DMV blames Tandem
- Tandem blames DMV

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### United Airlines/Univac

Automated reservations, ticketing, flight scheduling, fuel delivery, kitchens, and general administration

started: 1966, target 1968  
scrapped: 1970  
spent: \$50M

- Second system: tried to automate everything, including the kitchen
- "Enhancement" concurrent with "stabilization"

(repeat: Burroughs/TWA)

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### CONFIRM

Hilton, Marriott, Budget, American Airlines

Hotel reservations linked with airline and car rental

started: 1988  
scrapped: 1992  
spent: \$125M

- Second system
- Very dull tools (machine language)
- Bad-news diode
- See CACM October 1994, for details

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### Advanced Logistics System

U.S. Air Force materiel and transport tracking

started: 1968  
scrapped: 1975  
spent: \$250M

- Second system effect
- Estimated \$480M more needed to complete the system

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### SACSS(California) Statewide Automated Child-Support System

Started: 1991 (\$99M)  
"on hold": Sept. 1997  
cost: \$300M

- "Lockheed and HWDC disagree on what the system contains and which part of it isn't working."
- "Departments should not deploy a system to additional users if it is not working."
- "...should be broken into smaller, more easily managed projects..."

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### Taurus

British Stock Exchange share settlement system

started: 1990  
scrapped: 1993  
spent: £400M = \$600M

- "Massive complexity of the back-end systems..."
- All-or-nothing approach, nothing to show until everything works
- Shifting requirements
- Responsibility disconnected from control
- Bad-news diode in action
- Thorough report in Drummond, *Escalation in Decision-Making* (1996)

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### IBM Workplace OS for PPC

Mach 3.0 + binary compatibility with AIX, DOS, MacOS, OS/400 + new clock mgt + new RPC + new I/O + new CPU

started: 1991  
scrapped: 1996  
spent: \$2B (est.)

- 400 staff on kernel, 1500 elsewhere
- "Sheer complexity of the class structure proved to be overwhelming"
- Big-endian/little-endian not solved
- Inflexibility of frozen class structure
- report in Fleisch, HOT-OS 1997

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### Tax systems modernization plan

U.S. Internal Revenue Service, to replace 27 aging systems

started: 1989 (est.: \$7B)  
scrapped: 1997  
spent: \$4B

- All-or-nothing massive upgrade
- Systems "do not work in real world"
- Government procurement regulations

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## Advanced Automation System

U.S. Federal Aviation Administration

Replaces 1972 Air Route Traffic Control System

started: 1982  
scrapped: 1994  
spent: \$6B

- Changing specifications
- Grandiose expectations
- Congressional meddling

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## London Ambulance Service


Ambulance dispatching

started: 1991  
scrapped: 1992  
cost: 20 lives lost in 2 days of operation, \$2.5M

- Unrealistic schedule (5 months)
- Overambitious objectives
- Unidentifiable project manager
- Low bidder had no experience
- Backup system not checked out
- No testing/overlap with old system
- Users not consulted during design

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## 1995 Standish Group study



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## Recurring problems

- Incommensurate scaling
- Second-system effect
- Mythical man-month
- Bad ideas get included
- Wrong modularity
- Bad-news diode

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## Why aren't abstraction, modularity, hierarchy, and layers enough?

- First, you must understand what you are doing.
- It is easy to create abstractions; it is hard to discover the *right* abstraction.
- It is hard to change the abstractions later.

(ditto for modularity, hierarchy, and layers)

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## Fighting back: Use sweeping simplifications

Some modular boundaries work better than others

By chapter...

- 1: Processors, memory, communication links
- 2: Dedicated servers
- 3:  $N$ -level memories,  $N = 2$
- 4: Best-effort network
- 5: Delegate administration
- 6: Signing *and* sealing
- 7: Fail-fast, pair-and-compare
- 8: Avoid overwriting data

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## Fighting Back: Control Novelty

Sources of excessive novelty...

- Second-system effect
- Technology is better
- Idea worked in isolation
- Marketing pressure

Some novelty is necessary; the hard part is figuring out when to say **No**.

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## Fighting back: Feedback

Design for Iteration, Iterate the Design

- Something simple working soon
- One new problem at a time
- Find ways to find flaws early
- Use iteration-friendly design
- Bypass the bad-news diode
- General: Learn from failure

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## Brooks's version:

### Rationalism

↓  
plan  
↓  
specify  
↓  
design  
↓  
build  
↓  
ship

vs  
**Empiricism**

```

    ↓
    build prototype
    ↓
    discover problems
    ↓
    repeat till OK
    ↓
    ship.
  
```

(stolen from Brooks, 1993)


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## Fighting back: Find bad ideas fast

- Examine the requirements  
"and ferry itself across the Atlantic"  
(LHX light attack helicopter)
- Try ideas out—but don't  
hesitate to scrap them
- Understand the design loop

*Requires strong, knowledgeable  
management*

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## Fighting back: Find flaws fast

- Plan, plan, plan
- Simulate, simulate, simulate
- Design reviews, coding  
reviews, regression tests,  
performance measurements
- Design the feedback system  
e.g., alpha test + beta test,  
no-penalty reports,  
incentives &  
reinforcement

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## Use iteration-friendly design methods

- Authentication logic (Ch 6)
- Alibis (space shuttle)
- Failure tolerance models  
(Ch 7)

General method:

- document all assumptions
- provide feedback paths
- when feedback arrives,  
review assumptions

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## Fighting back: Conceptual integrity

- One mind controls the  
design
  - *Reims cathedral*
  - *Macintosh*
  - *Visicalc*
  - *Linux*
  - *X Window System*
- Good esthetics yields  
more successful systems
  - *Parsimony*
  - *Orthogonality*
  - *Elegance*

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## Obstacles


- Hard to find the right  
modularity
- Tension: need the best  
designers—but they are the  
hardest to manage
- *The Mythical Man-Month*  
(Brooks): Adding more  
people to a late project  
makes it later.

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
## Fighting back: Summary

- Use sweeping simplifications
- Control novelty
- Install feedback
- Find bad ideas fast
- Use iteration-friendly design  
methods
- Conceptual integrity

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